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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over cases transferred to the Court 
of Appeals from the Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j). The 
Utah Supreme Court had appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-
102(j) over this case which was transferred to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78A-3-102(4). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Did the District Court err in its Order on Outstanding Motions dated June 
22, 2009 [R. 3933] by awarding defendants as sanctions only the sum of $7,475 with 
respect to defendants' Second Motion for Sanctions dated June 24, 2008, which the Court 
granted? 
Standard of Review: The standard of review is abuse of discretion. Bodell 
Constr. Co. v. Robbins, 2009 UT 52, «|[ 16. 
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved in the District Court through 
defendants' Second Motion for Sanctions dated June 24, 2008 [R. 2215] (which was filed 
before trial and sought dismissal with prejudice of plaintiffs' Complaint and an award of 
attorneys' fees) and in oral argument of the Second Motion for Sanctions (following the 
Jury's rejection of all claims in the Complaint) during which defendants' counsel 
requested that the District Court order PC Crane and its counsel at a minimum to pay all 
legal fees that McQueen incurred as a result of their misrepresentations and concealments 
concerning the subject trailer during discovery. [R. 4003, T. 76-77]. 
1 
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2. Did the District Court err in its Order on Outstanding Motions dated June 
22, 2009 [R. 3933] by denying defendants' Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and 
Expenses dated November 3, 2008? , 
Standard of Review: The standard of review is correctness. EDSA/Cloward, 
LLCv. Klibanoff, 2008 UT App. 284, 192 P.3d 296. 
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved in the District Court through 
defendants' Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Expenses dated November 3, 2008 
[R. 3477] and Memorandum in support thereof [R. 3480]. 
3. Did the District Court err in its Order on Outstanding Motions dated June 
22, 2009 [R. 3933] by denying defendants' Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and 
Expenses against Guarantors dated December 19, 2008? 
Standard of Review: The standard of review is correctness. EDSA/Cloward, 
LLC v. Klibanojfc 2008 UT App. 284, 192 P.3d 296. 
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved in defendants' Motion for Award < 
of Attorney's Fees and Expenses Against Guarantors dated December 19, 2008 [R. 3842] 
and Memorandum in support thereof [R. 3845]. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules and regulations 
whose interpretation is determinative of this appeal or of central importance to this 
appeal. 
i 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
For the remainder of this Brief, plaintiff PC Crane, LLC will hereinafter be 
referred to as "PC Crane," defendants David Belcher, Vernon Belcher, and Paul Belcher 
(all owners of PC Crane) will hereinafter collectively be referred to as "Belchers," 
Belchers' company, LACY, LLC, will be referred to as "Lacy," and defendants McQueen 
Masonry, Inc., Central Equipment, LC, McQueen Crane Services, LC, and James 
McQueen will collectively be referred to as "McQueen." 
Nature of the Case 
This appeal is about attorney's fees and discovery abuse. Appellants McQueen 
prevailed on all issues before the Jury. 
PC Crane, in two separate transactions, contracted to purchase from McQueen (i) 
cranes and (ii) "goodwill" associated with those cranes. PC Crane claims it paid 
McQueen for "goodwill" through two Promissory Notes (the "Goodwill Notes"). David 
and Vernon Belcher and Lacy (the "Guarantors") guaranteed PC Crane's obligations to 
McQueen. PC Crane and the Guarantors initiated this action against McQueen to escape 
liability under the Goodwill Notes. 
The most critical evidence for McQueen was in the hands of PC Crane and 
Belchers, who over an extended period attempted through persistent obstruction and 
misrepresentations to hide from McQueen the most relevant facts and documents.1 After 
lWe are mindful that courts are generally not receptive to such charges, 
particularly when they are leveled at reputable firms or attorneys. But when parties 
actually engage in such behavior, as they will be shown to have done here, their behavior 
deserves candid recognition and fair redress. 
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extensive discovery enforcement procedures, McQueen finally obtained the critical 
evidence and prevailed oh all issues before the Jury. 
On this appeal, McQueen first seeks a fair sanction for this gross discovery abuse. 
Second, McQueen seeks to recover their attorney's fees in defending against PC Crane's 
and the Guarantors' unsuccessful effort to escape liability under the Goodwill Notes. 
Course of Proceedings 
PC Crane and the Guarantors initiated this action on September 15, 2006. [R. 1]. 
The case was tried to a Jury between October 20 and 24, 2008. The Jury returned a 
Special Verdict in favor of McQueen, which rejected all of PC Crane and the Guarantors' 
claims. [R. 3316]. The Honorable L. A. Dever presided over this case from its inception 
through trial. McQueen's Second Motion for Sanctions was filed prior to trial, but Judge 
Dever declined to hear it. After prevailing at trial, McQueen on October 31, 2008 moved 
to disqualify Judge Dever [R. 3374]. Judge Dever disqualified himself on November 3, 
2008 [R. 3519] and the case was assigned to the Honorable Robin R. Reese [R. 3521], i 
who heard the motions at issue on this appeal. Final Judgment was entered August 18, 
2009 [R. 3971]. This appeal followed [R. 3982]. 
< 
Disposition in the Court Below 
Following trial, through the Order on Outstanding Motions entered June 23, 2009 
[R. 3933], Judge Reese (i) granted McQueen's Second Motion for Sanctions dated June 
24, 2008 and awarded McQueen sanctions of $7,475.00, and (ii) denied McQueen's 
Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Expenses dated November 23, 2008 and < 
4 
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McQueen's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Expenses Against Guarantors dated 
December 19, 2008. 
Statement of Facts 
As noted, this appeal is about attorney's fees and discovery abuse. McQueen 
prevailed on all substantive issues before the Jury. This Statement of Facts will be 
presented in three sections: (1) The facts from which PC Crane/Guarantors' claims arose, 
(2) the discovery abuses themselves, and (3) the facts pertinent to McQueen's claim for 
recovery of attorney's fees based on the parties'contracts. 
I. Facts Pertinent to the Parties' Claims 
McQueen and PC Crane (a company owned by Belchers) entered into two separate 
agreements involving the sale of cranes and the goodwill associated with those cranes -
one in October, 2004 [Ex. 2] and one in April, 2005 [Ex. 7].2 PC Crane claimed the 
"goodwill" in each transaction was paid through a Promissory Note. [R. 3, J^ 25; R. 6, ^ 
33-34]. The Addendum includes copies of both Goodwill Notes [Exs. 83 and 1 1 -
Addendum pp. 4 and 1], which were included as exhibits to the parties' two Agreements. 
[Exs. 2 and 7]. 
PC Crane argued that "goodwill" was mainly a transfer to PC Crane of McQueen's 
2Some closing documents bear typewritten dates in March, 2005, but the 
documents were actually executed and the transaction closed April 14-15, 2005. [R. 
1910; R. 3499-3503; V. Belcher Depo. R. 1899, pp. 23-25; D. Belcher Depo. R. 1902-03, 
pp. 70-71.] 
3PC Crane asserted that, of this Note's face amount of $177,600, $132,600 was 
attributed to the "goodwill" payment. [R, 16, Tf 88; R. 23, ^  144-45.] 
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customers who used the cranes in question. [R. 12-13, ^ 60-71]. PC Crane alleged that 
McQueen had utilized a crane broker named Lon Stam ("Stam"), who had most of the 
crane customer relationships and that McQueen fraudulently misrepresented and hid from 
PC Crane the fact that Stam was his crane broker and had substantially all of the customer 
contacts [R. 12-13, ffif 64-71; R. 22-23, ffif 134-142; R. 23, ffif 146-150]. McQueen, on the 
other hand, asserted that "goodwill" included McQueen's many efforts to facilitate PC 
Crane's starting out in the crane business and McQueen's effort to transition customers 
from McQueen to PC Crane. As concerns Stam, Jamie McQueen asserted that he told 
Belchers that Stam was his crane broker, he gave Belchers records plainly showing that 
Stam brokered a large fraction of McQueen's crane work, and he introduced Belchers to 
Stam so that PC Crane could make whatever deal they wanted with Stam. 
Belchers testified in their depositions that they did not know who Stam was or 
what he did and had no substantive conversations with him until following the second 
crane transaction4 (which closed in mid-April, 20055). During discovery, McQueen ( 
repeatedly asserted that Belchers and Stam knew all about each other and Stam's 
involvement in McQueen*5s business long before the April, 2005 transaction, that Stam 
and Belchers communicated extensively during that period, and, indeed, Belchers told 
McQueen they had made a deal with Stam to assist them with their business before the 
. — i 
4Stam Depo. R. 1570-71, pp. 96-98; D. Belcher Depo., R. 1564-65, pp. 53-56 (the 
777 transaction to which Stam and Belchers refer is the April, 2005 transaction). 
5Some closing documents bear typewritten dates in March, 2005, but the 
documents were executed and the transaction closed April 14-15, 2005. See Note 2, 
supra. 
6 
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second transaction in April, 2005 [Eg., R, 833; R. 941-42; R. 1538]. Thus, the central 
issue in this case was whether PC Crane/Belchers had any substantive 
communications or relationship with Stam before the second crane transaction in 
April, 2005. 
2. PC Crane's Discovery Abuse 
After Belchers and Stam testified in their depositions (it turns out falsely) that they 
did not know each other until after the second crane transaction that closed in April, 2005, 
McQueen sought through discovery to obtain from PC Crane, Belchers, and Stam (the 
only source for such information) evidence that would prove that they had testified 
falsely. McQueen, through requests for production to PC Crane [R. 866, ^ 3; R. 873-74, 
fflj 3, 4, 5] and a Subpoena to Stam [R. 142, Yff 2, 5, 8], sought a copy of the Commission 
Agreement that Belchers and Stam all testified existed6 between PC Crane and Stam 
through which Stam was paid a 10% commission to broker crane work for PC Crane. PC 
Crane never produced the Commission Agreement.7 McQueen moved to compel [R. 828, 
832]. PC Crane claimed that an unexecuted draft document (numbered PC 697-98 [R. 
1682] included in Addendum at pp. 16-17) represented the only such document [R. 924-
25; R. 966]. Interestingly, PC Crane's counsel initially refused to produce this document 
claiming that it had not been shown to third parties and was protected as work product. 
6Stam Depo. [R. 852-855]; D. Belcher Depo. [R. 857-859]; P. Belcher Depo. [R. 
861-862]. 
7PC Crane objected that this simple, obviously relevant request was overly broad, 
burdensome, and irrelevant [R. 873, Req. No. 3]. 
7 
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[R. 924, n. 3]. This document was obviously not the Commission Agreement that Stam 
and Belchers all testified existed: Belchers and Stam testified that the subject 
Commission Agreement was executed by all parties (Stam Depo. [R. 853]; D. Belcher 
Depo. [R. 858-59]). The unexecuted draft document offered by PC Crane (dated May, 
2005) addressed Stam's option to acquire an equity interest in PC Crane and seemed to 
suggest that it changed Stam's commission ("the referral fee . . . shall hence forth be 
. . ."). [R. 1682; Addendum p. 16]. In addition, Stam testified that there were two 
Agreements between Stam and PC Crane — one covering the commission relationship 
between Stam and PC Crane and one through which Stam acquired an interest in PC 
Crane (Stam Depo. [R. 853-54]). Paul Belcher even testified that the Commission 
Agreement was executed in March, 2005. [P. Belcher Depo. (R. 862, pp. 158-59)]. The 
District Court, twice, ordered the Commission Agreement produced [R. 1098, <f[ 2(d); R. 
2082, f2]. PC Crane's counsel alternatively argued, inconsistently, that (i) there was no 
such written agreement covering Stam's commission [R. 924-25; R. 4001, T. pp. 40-42], 
and (ii) when the District Court noted that it was "odd" that PC Crane was paying Stam 
"all this money" based on no agreement, PC Crane's counsel said, "[P]erhaps there's a 
signed one out there. My client can't find a copy of it." [R. 4002, T. 30-31]. Because PC 
Crane and Stam never produced the executed Commission Agreement that both Stam and 
Belchers testified existed, McQueen was not able to show it and its date (which was the 
critical fact) to the Jury. 
McQueen then sought through interrogatory all of Belchers' and Stam's telephone 
8 
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numbers so that their telephone records could be subpoenaed. PC Crane refused to give 
McQueen the telephone numbers for Stam, claiming that Stam was not a party to the case 
[R. 879]. At the time PC Crane asserted this frivolous objection, Stam was an owner of 
PC Crane. Natin : Jiout all of Stam's phone numbers, the phone records of the 
Belchers would be useless to show contacts with Stam.8 After McQueen filed their first 
Motion to Compel, defendants supplied Stam's phone numbers, thereby demonstrating 
that they knew them. • long and tl n it ll leii objections to procit icii ig this known 
information was a sham [R. 925]. McQueen subpoenaed the cell phone records of Stam 
and the Belchers. Those telephone records demonstrated about 80 contacts between the 
Belchers and Stam prior to the second crane transaction's closing. [Ex, 1109]. Thus, 
Belchers aiid Stam, who previously testified under oatli they had no substantive contact 
and didn't know who each other was before the second crane transaction, spoke together 
by cell phone on more than 80 occasions in the three and a half months or so before the 
closing of the second crane transaction. 
I he cell phone records, however, did not reveal the content of the Belcher-Stam 
communications, and neither Stam nor PC Crane ever produced the Commission 
Agreement that they all testified they executed, which woiild have revealed the date of 
their arrangement. PC Crane had told McQueen it had made a deal with Stam before the 
8PC Crane later sought to justify its refusal with the claim that McQueen already 
knew Stam's number. McQueen did know some of Stam's numbers, but this obviously 
does not justify PC Crane's refusal to disclose this relevant information. 
9R. 1585-1621; Ex. 110 has highlighted the calls between Stam and Belchers. 
Stam's numbers are revealed at R. 925, and Belchers' numbers are revealed at R. 879-80. 
9 
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second crane transaction. To convince a Jury that he had not hidden Stam's important 
role from Belchers and that Belchers had a relationship with Stam before the second crane 
transaction, McQueen needed an indication that Belchers and Stam were actively 
cooperating in the crane business before the second transaction in April, 2005. McQueen 
believed that, in connection with applying for financing for its brand new company, PC 
Crane may have given lenders business plans that included references to Stam and his 
role in the PC Crane business. McQueen therefore on June 5, 2007 submitted to PC 
Crane's lenders, including Bank of American Fork, a Subpoena Duces Tecum seeking 
production of all such materials [R. 424]. PC Crane moved to quash the subpoena to 
Bank of American Fork and other lenders on the grounds that the Subpoena improperly 
sought "irrelevant" information that was "confidential"10 [R. 462-469]. After the District 
Court refused to quash the subpoena seeking that information [R. 1096, ^ 1], McQueen 
obtained from Bank of American Fork11 the document that ultimately destroyed PC 
Crane's case — PC Crane's own description of its involvement with Stam [Ex. 61]. The 
most relevant portions of that document are included in the Addendum at pp. 18-26 (the 
"Bank Disclosure"). First, this document stated (in stark contrast to Belchers' deposition 
testimony that they were forced to use Stam's services) as follows: 
10McQueen had already stipulated to a Protective Order protecting the 
confidentiality of such documents [R. 167]. 
nPC Crane produced a portion of the same document. PC Crane initially asserted 
it was "irrelevant" and then steadfastly obstructed its production for over 5 months. [See 
R. 1888-1889 and attached Exhibits referred to therein, which outlines this remarkable 
obstruction.] 
10 
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In our [PC Crane's] efforts to build a strong marketing 
position we searched out one of the most well-connected crane 
brokers in the entire region. Lon Stam . . . has more than 30 years of 
brokering crane service in Utah. Lon Stam has provided a high level 
of credibility to our crane company. 
And then in the same document PC Crane (n liicli w r Mini doing business as McQueen 
Crane) stated the following: 
One of the operational decisions that we [PC Crane] and Lon 
[Stam] collaborated on was in the building of a custom-designed 
trailer that gives us the ability to use our 300 ton hydraulic Liebherr 
crane as either a 300 ton crane or a 165 ton crane. This is the 
primary reason for the drastic increase in the annual revenue 
production of this machine. 
* # * 
The crawler cranes are the next business endeavor that we 
[PC Crane] are collaborating with Lon to undertake. The 
opportunity to purchase the crawlers came via Lon through a long 
time business associate Gordon Olsen. [Ex. 61, p. BAF 154.] 
A part of the same document obtained from Bank of American Fork (this part was absent 
from the document PC Crane produced) demonstrated that the "crawler cranes" business 
endeavor w ill i Goi d :>i I Olsen (win- •• Vane in the Bank Disclosure said was its "next" 
collaboration after the trailer with Stam) occurred in late 2005 [Ex. 61, pp. BAF 171-175; 
Addendum pp. 22-26] — therefore, the Stam-Belcher collaboration on building a custom-
designed trailer necessarily occurred before the end of 2005. 
In the eight-plus months that followed, McQueen expended multiple tens of 
thousands of dollars in legal fees in seeking to prove what turned out to be the truth — PC 
Crane had created ONLY ONE custom-designed, modified trailer, and that trailer was 
modifi : the February, 2005 to !\Ian:h, 2005 frame ~ before the second 
11 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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crane transaction with McQueen and during the time when Belchers and Stam uniformly 
testified they didn't know who each other was. The Second Motion for Sanctions sought 
redress for PC Crane and its attorneys' obstructionist and dishonest behavior throughout 
that long, extremely expensive process. 
Thumbnail Sketch. Here is a thumbnail sketch of what happened, which is 
outlined in sequential detail below. What PC Crane and its attorneys did was to take the 
position with McQueen's*attorney and the Court that the custom-designed trailer on 
which PC Crane and Stam collaborated actually existed12 but was constructed after the 
"relevant period" established by the Court (the end of 2005) and that, accordingly, they 
did not have to supply any information about it. When McQueen, through a private 
detective, identified a trailer that was modified by PC Crane in early 2005 consistently 
with the description in the Bank Disclosure, PC Crane and its counsel conceded that this 
was a trailer that was modified by PC Crane in early 2005, but it was not the trailer that 
Stam and Belchers collaborated on to which reference was made in the Bank Disclosure 
— rather, the trailer referred to in the Bank Disclosure was collaborated on and modified 
after the end of 2005. After about 8 months of litigating this issue, PC Crane and its 
counsel were finally required by the District Court to produce the documents and 
information concerning the modification of the post-2005 trailer that PC Crane and its 
,2It obviously existed — otherwise, how could this modified trailer have been the 
"primary reason for the drastic increase in the annual revenue production of [their 
cranes]" as PC Crane stated in the Bank Disclosure? 
12 
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counsel 1lad been saying again and again existed13 and was the one mentioned in the Bank 
Disclosure. Now faced with having to prove that a post-2005 modified trailer existed (as 
PC Crane and its counsel repeatedly told the District Court and McQueen's counsel), they 
completely c : ncir story and stated that no such trailer ever existed or was ever 
constructed or modified. That is, (i) PC Crane's statement to Bank of American Fork that 
it and Stam "collaborated on . . . in the building of a custom-designed trailer [and] . . . . 
that is the primary reason for the drastic increase in the annual revenue production of this 
machine" «;ts i < nmph (c 1 list hood, and (ii) that PC Crane and its counsel's i nultiple 
statements to the Court and McQueen's counsel that the trailer referred to in that 
quotation was in fact collaborated on and built after the end of 2005 was also a complete 
falsehood. In fact, however, the trailer modified in February an n Ii 200 was the 
(nil",, ii ailer III,it: was ever modified by PC Crane, ana us modification was consistent with 
PC Crane's description of its purpose in the Bank Disclosure. 
Here is the disturbing story of McQueen's effort to prove that the only trailer that 
could possibly have beei i the one thai Slim ,imi Bdi ln-iit modified and utllLiboialoJ on 
was modified in February to March, 2005: 
What Happened Sequentially. McQueen on July 3, 2007 served its Third Set of 
Interrogatories and Request for Production requesting information concerning dates of 
constrm lion ol ihr Irailn, \\ ho pailic ipaled in its modification, and documents 
concerning those subjects. [R. 662; R. 947]. PC Crane filed identical, patently frivolous 
13Id. 
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objections to ah such requests objecting that they were "overly broad, unduly 
burdensome, and . . . not relevant" and refused to respond. [R. 947]. McQueen, on 
August 3, 2007, moved the Court to extend the discovery schedule dates for 2 months 
because PC Crane had, through Motions to Quash and objections, stalled McQueen's 
discovery [R. 903]. PC Crane objected to McQueen's requested extension because 
McQueen's discovery was seeking "irrelevant" information [R. 956]. McQueen's 
counsel, Maak, sent PC Crane's counsel, Burghardt, an email August 10, 2007 explaining 
the obvious relevance of the information sought through the Third Set and requesting 
production. [R. 2279]. Burghardt responded by letter stating that prior to April 2005, 
"PC Crane and Mr. Stam had no communications or interaction concerning the subject 
trailer." [R. 2281]. On August 13, 2007 Burghardt emailed Maak saying that he would 
respond to the interrogatories if they were limited to the period between October, 2004 
and April, 2005. [R. 2284]. Maak emailed Burghardt indicating he was unwilling to 
limit the time period to prior to April 2005. [R. 2287]. 
McQueen on August 10, 2007 moved to compel responses to the Third Set of 
Interrogatories and Requests. [R. 940]. In its response filed August 30, 2007, PC Crane 
indicated that McQueen sought information about the trailer in question and then stated: 
"Even though plaintiffs believe the records concerning the subject trailer are not relevant 
to the issues in this case, they are willing to respond to the Discovery Requests if limited 
to the relevant time period of October, 2004 to March, 2005." PC Crane requested that 
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the Court limit McQueen's discovery to the period prior to March, 2005.14 [R. 994, 
R. 997-98]. At the hearing before the Court on McQueen's Motion to Compel, Burghardt 
stated as follows to the Court: "[T]here was a document produced by us [the Bank 
Disclosure] that made some reference to Mr. Stam and PC Crane ccr.ti-^rating on a 
trailer. This trailer. Your Honor, as we certified in a letter, this collaboration occurred 
much after the purchase of the fourth crane in April of 2005. It was well into the year 
2006." Later he stated, "The trailer wasn't even conceived of until the year 2006 between 
Stam and the Belchers. At that time, a year and a half after they purchased the first 
cranes, there clearly is no relevance to their collaboration on this trailer." [R. 4001; T. 
50-52]. Burghardt thus represented to the Court that the subject trailer and collaboration 
occurred, but after the end ol 2005 and that McQueen's requests for information about it 
were irrelevant. The District Court on November 2, 2007 entered an Order on Motion to 
Quash and Motions to Compel, which required production of all documents relating to the 
trailer prior to December, 2005.15 [R. 1096, ^ 2(e)]. In response, Burghardt sent Maak a 
letter stating that "plaintiffs have no responsive documents."16 [R. 230 ]. 
McQueen then sent its Fourth Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production, 
14So long as PC Crane could prevent McQueen from discovering on the very trailer 
(whenever built) that PC Crane and Stam claimed they modified together, PC Crane could 
continue to perpetuate the false claim that the subject trailer existed, but was modified 
long after the second crane transaction. As will be seen, this is what they did 
15Judge Dever accommodated PC Crane's request to limit the discovery period in 
this manner. 
,6As predicted, PC Crane claimed that there were no documents relating to the 
modified trailer prior to December 2005. 
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which in paragraph 4 requested that PC Crane identify all drop deck trailers [i.e., the 
trailer variety that was modified] that it owned . [R. 1555, j^ 4]. PC Crane objected to the 
request again frivolously claiming that it was over broad, unduly burdensome, and seeks 
irrelevant information. [R. 1555]. In an effort to terminate further discovery, PC Crane 
filed a Request for Trial Setting on December 4, 2007 [R. 1521] which certified, 
incorrectly, that "[d]iscovery is completed and . . . the case is ready for trial." Through a 
private detective's efforts, McQueen discovered the modified trailer and that it had been 
modified in Spring 2005. On December 7, 2007, Maak wrote Burghardt, observed that 
the Court had ordered production of documents relating to the trailer prior to December, 
2005, and that he had independently verified the existence of the trailer. Maak stated: 
We intend to seek sanctions if the documents relating to this trailer 
and the answer to Interrogatory No. 4 are not immediately 
forthcoming. When we do, and when this matter plays out, we do 
not want you or your client to be able to say that there was some 
innocent mistake made. You and your client are on notice that the 
trailer in question was made and titled during the time period for 
which production was ordered by the Court. If these documents are 
not produced now, in response to this very pointed request, it will be 
clear that they have been intentionally withheld. [R. 2309] 
Burghardt responded, drawing a cute distinction between the date of the original 
manufacture of the subject trailer and the date of its modification. He suggested that, 
although the "original unmodified trailer" was manufactured earlier, the Court's Order 
addressed "the manufacture of the customized trailer." Burghardt stated that PC Crane 
had "no documents relating to the manufacture of the 'custom designed trailer' prior to 
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December 2005."17 [R. 2312]. 
McQueen filed its Third Motion to Compel on December 13, 2007 seeking 
production of documents relating to any trailer modified by PC Crane and requiring PC 
Crane to identif rniler identifier . i- <.•• 5i•-• • •• PC Crane ;u a Stam 
collaborated on) [R. 1533]. In its response dated January 4, 2008, PC Crane stated that it 
objected to the request "because it sought information outside of the scope of discovery 
authorized by the Court" — that is, for the period after December 31, 2005 — and that 
McQueen's seeking such intormation to ensure that PC Crane was not hiding documents 
was improper.18 [R. 1633-34,^37-38]. Later they stated that "Plaintiffs have certified 
at least three times that they have no documents for the 'custom designed trailer' 
originating before December 2005."19 [R. ' . 
At tlle 1tearing of McQueen's Third Motion to Compel on March 4, 2008, 
argument by both sides focused on the existence of two modified trailers, and (1) 
McQueen's need to determine which of these two was the one that was the subject of 
Stam-Belcl lei s collaboration, and (2) PC Crane's assertion tl ia.1: the second ti ailei > vl rich 
17Again, Burghardt is suggesting that the subject unmodified trailer existed earlier, 
but its customization occurred after 2005 — a complete falsehood. 
1
 throughout the process, PC Crane's attorneys asserted, indignantly, that 
McQueen's counsel was wrong to assert that PC Crane's counsel was not being entirely 
forthcoming. That is a tactic that credible attorneys can usefully employ. It redoubles the 
seriousness of the behavior presented here. PC Crane's counsel attempted to terminate 
the discovery based on their credibility with respect to statements they knew to be false. 
I9As will be shown, PC Crane finally produced documents for the only custom 
designed trailer that PC Crane ever built dated in February-March, 2005, which 
demonstrates that this representation to the Court was also false. 
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was the one Stam and Belchers collaborated on, was not relevant because it was created 
after December, 2005. In PC Crane's counsel's own words, at this hearing, they 
"represented that the Fontaine [the trailer modified in early 2005] and the 'custom 
designed trailer' were two different trailers" [R. 2427, If 30] and that "[a]t the March 4 
[2008] hearing [PC Crane] informed the Court and counsel that the trailer modified in 
March 2005 [the Fontaine trailer] was a different one than Vern [Belcher] modified, and 
was not the 'custom designed trailer' . . . ." [R. 2428, ^ 36]. As will be shown, these 
representations were also false. 
McQueen expressed frustration that PC Crane was not allowing discovery on both 
trailers, which prevented McQueen from knowing which of the two trailers was the one 
on which Stam and Belchers collaborated: 
[MR. MAAK:] Now, we have independent information that the 
modified trailer was built and modified in the February /March 2005 time 
frame and it was a drop-deck trailer. So here in PC's documents, we have 
evidence that they are disbursing money in March of 2005 to repair and 
build a drop-deck trailer. 
* * * 
Now, the Court entered its order compelling PC Crane to produce all 
the documents about modification, titling and so forth of this specific 
trailer. And they responded that there are none. 
After they responded that there are none, I wrote them a letter and I 
said, "We know that it happened. If you don't produce them, it's going to 
be clear that you intentionally withheld them." They still said, 'They don't 
exist." 
So they have a problem here. The only way they can escape this 
problem — if the Court allows us to finish our discovery on this — only way 
they can escape is to say that the drop-deck trailer referred to in tab 3 is not 
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the one; there's another one somewhere. So I sent them an interrogatory 
and I asked them to identify every drop-deck trailer they owned between 
October of c04 and December of '05 and tell me which one is the one that's 
referred to in this narrative. Their response? "We won't tell you anything. 
We object. It's overbroad. It's unduly burdensome, it's irrelevant, it's 
outside the scope of the Court's order." 
Now, I'm informed that they've owned two drop-deck trailers. Is it 
burdensome to tell me what they are? It is surely relevant. Is it outside the 
scope of the Court's order? The Court's order didn't tell me I couldn't ask 
anymore questions. But the Court's order had as its cutoff date December 
31, 2005. And I asked for trailers, drop-deck trailers prior to that date. 
Now, I submit to the Court - I don't say this lightly - that objection 
in this context is frivolous, it's advanced in bad faith, it's baseless, and in 
the context of this dispute, it demonstrates what I have been going through 
for the last year and a half. 
Again, I do not say this lightly. PC Crane is intentionally refusing to 
give us discovery information that is absolutely critical to our case that this 
Court has ordered produced. 
[R. 4002, ] -12]. 
Mr. Barneck stated as follows: 
[T]he Court said, in its Order - and we — that's what we're 
going by — in paragraph 2(e) it says, "All documents created prior to 
December, 2005 concerning the design, production, and mamifacture 
or construction of that certain custom designed trailer." 
Your Honor, there aren't any documents and Counsel can 
believe there are until the cows come home, but that won't create 
documents that don't exist. Did they collaborate? Yes, they did. 
What was the time of that collaboration? I don't know. I don't 
agree with Counsel's assertion that because the next paragraph says 
the next business endeavor means that it was the next one in 
chronological order? I don't know what they meant by that. But 
they did collaborate and there just aren't any documents. 
Mr. Barneck continued: 
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PC Crane wanted a drop-deck trailer like this, they wanted to 
create one. This [trailer modified in 2005] was for a different crane. 
It was for the 165 Liebherr. The other one that Counsel's 
complaining about from the loan documents was for the 300. 
Different crane. 
. . . Vern [Belcher] went out and bought one and - and worked 
on it himself. And that was the expense for it. It's not the same one; 
it was built for a different crane. 
[R. 4002, T. 38-39]. 
The Court made clear that the issue was whether the modified trailer discovered by 
McQueen was the same as the trailer at issue in this case, on which Stam and Belchers 
collaborated: 
THE COURT: It appears to me that the plaintiffs should produce 
copies of the information concerning the modification of whatever trailer 
was done to establish whether or not it was the same trailer that's at issue in 
this particular case. And so any information about work on trailers done 
between March of '05 and December of '05, on any trailer, should be 
produced to the defendants. 
[R. 4002, p. 66]. 
On March 20, 2008, the District Court entered an Order on McQueen's Third 
Motion to Compel and Motion to Impose Sanctions requiring PC Crane to supply all 
documents reflecting work done to modify any drop deck trailers owned by plaintiffs 
prior to December 31, 2005 and to allow McQueen to depose PC Crane's principals on 
the subject of work done to modify any drop deck trailer. [R. 2081]. In response to that 
Order, Burghardt sent Maak a letter dated March 26, 2008 in which PC Crane completely 
changed its position on the subject trailer — instead of continuing to assert and by his own 
admission again and again "certify" [R. 4001; T. 50-52] that the "subject trailer" had been 
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built long after December, 2005, PC Crane and its counsel now stated that "THE 
TRAILER . . . WAS NEVER BUILT"! [R. 2334]. In other words, once the Court 
allowed discovery that would demonstrate that the "subject trailer" was in fact modified 
in March and April, 2005, PC Crane changed the position that it had been certifying and 
representing to the Court and to McQueen for 8 months from the claim that there were 
two modified trailers and the "subject trailer" was modified in 2006 to the position that 
there was only one such trailer and the subject trailer was never built at all and did not 
exist. 
The depositions of the Belchers and Stam that were allowed by the Order on Third 
Motion to Compel make clear that the trailer modified in March and April of 2005 was in 
fact the modified trailer to which PC Crane referred in the Bank Disclosure -- "a custom 
designed trailer that gives [PC Crane] the ability to use our 300 ton . . . crane as either a 
300-ton crane or a 165-ton crane." Paul Belcher testified that the trailer referred to in the 
Bank Disclosure would have to be modified so that it could carry more weight because 
the counterweights used for a 300-ton crane are heavier than those used for a 165-ton 
crane. [P. Belcher Depo.; R. 2337-38]. Dave Belcher testified that PC Crane has only 
modified one trailer — a 1996 Fontaine trailer, which was modified through the addition 
of a third axle and changing the axle spacing of the other two axles so that the trailer 
could carry more weight. [D. Belcher Depo.; R. 2342-43]. Dave Belcher also testified 
that the modified Fontaine trailer could be used to carry counterweights for both the 300-
ton and 165-ton cranes. [D. Belcher Depo.; R. 2342-43]. Vern Belcher testified that PC 
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Crane has built only one custom designed trailer - the 1996 Fontaine step deck trailer, 
which was purchased March 9, 2005 [V. Belcher Depo.; R. 2346-47] and that the 
modifications added a third axle and changed axle spacing so that the trailer could carry 
more weight [V. Belcher Depo.; R. 2347]. Vern Belcher testified that the modifications 
to the Fontaine trailer were effected by PC Crane before April 8, 2005 — that is, the 
modifications were effectuated between the purchase date of March 9 and April 8, 2005. 
[V. Belcher Depo., R. 2348-49]. Stam testified that the modified Fontaine trailer could 
haul counterweights for both the 165-ton and 300-ton cranes, and that the modified 
Fontaine trailer was in fact used with counterweights for the 300-ton crane. [Stam Depo.; 
R. 2355]. , 
So, the facts are as follows: 
(1) Paul Belcher gave banking institutions the Bank Disclosure stating 
that PC Crane had significantly increased its revenues through collaboration with 
Stam in designing and building a custom designed trailer which allowed the use of 
both a 165-ton and 300-ton crane configuration. That language makes absolutely 
clear that PC Crane was stating that the modified trailer was in fact constructed 
because PC Crane claimed that its construction allowed PC Crane to increase its 
usage of the cranes. 
(2) PC Crane only built one custom modified trailer — the 1996 Fontaine 
trailer that was modified between March and early April of 2005. That trailer was 
modified so that it could carry more weight As Belchers and Stam testified, in 
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order for a trailer to carry weights for the 165-ton or 300-ton cranes, a trailer 
would have to carry more weight. The Fontaine was modified in exactly the way 
that PC Crane testified a trailer would have to be modified to service both the 300-
ton and 165-ton cranes, and it was in fact used with both the 165 and 300-ton 
cranes. 
There is no doubt that the trailer that Paul Belcher stated in the Bank Disclosure was 
modified in collaboration with Stam was in fact the trailer that was modified in March 
and April, 2005.20 
But PC Crane had a problem — PC Crane and PC Crane's counsel had been 
representing to the District Court and McQueen that the subject modified trailer was built 
in 2006 and was "irrelevant" because it was built after the "relevant period" ending 
December 31, 2005. Because the only modified trailer was built squarely in the relevant 
time period - February to early-April, 2005, PC Crane could not continue with its 
deception. PC Crane then diametrically changed its representations to assert that Stam 
and Belchers never modified any trailer - the one referred to in the Bank Disclosure did 
20PC Crane argued in connection with McQueen's Second Motion for Sanctions 
that this trailer was not the collaborated trailer (i.e., that PC Crane lied to its Bank in 
saying that the collaborated trailer existed). It really doesn't matter. What does matter is 
that PC Crane and its counsel repeatedly stated falsely that there were two trailers, one of 
which was modified in 2006 - both lies. So long as PC Crane could preserve the false 
argument that the modified trailer existed and was built in 2006, PC Crane could prevent 
McQueen from telling the Jury that Stam and Belchers collaborated on a modified trailer 
and the only modified trailer that existed was built in March, 2005. 
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not exist. This new inconsistent position renders each objection to discovery baseless21 
and each statement and suggestion to the Court and McQueen that there were two 
modified trailers, that the collaborated trailer existed, and that it was modified in 2006 
complete falsehoods. The course of events makes clear that this was not an innocent 
mistake — it was a purposeful effort to prevent McQueen from discovering the damning 
evidence that Stam and Belchers were collaborating and modifying a trailer between 
February, 2005 and mid-April, 2005, when they swore they didn't even know each other. 
Judge Reese heard the Second Motion for Sanctions after the trial.22 The Second 
Motion for Sanctions sought the sanction of dismissal with prejudice because of the 
conduct of plaintiffs and their counsel "in (i) misrepresenting material facts to the Court, 
(ii) misrepresenting material facts to McQueen, (iii) disobeying this Court's discovery 
order, and (iv) filing baseless objections to discovery requests." Judge Reese granted that 
Motion after trial, but awarded McQueen as sanctions only the amount that McQueen 
spent in pursuing the Second Motion for Sanctions — $7,475.00. That amount does not 
remedy the multiple tens of thousands of dollars incurred by McQueen in attorney's fees 
over an eight-month period as a direct result of PC Crane, Belchers, and their counsel's 
2,How could a discovery request about the collaborated trailer be "overly broad, 
unduly burdensome, and irrelevant" if the answer were: "The trailer never existed"? 
How could trailer information be "outside the scope of discovery authorized by the 
Court" if no trailer was modified after December, 2005? 
22McQueen twice requested that Judge Dever hear this Motion before trial, but 
Judge Dever would not entertain it. 
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obstructionist and dishonest approach to this discovery process. 
3. McQueen's Request for an Award of Attorney's Fees Based Upon a Contract 
PC Crane asserted that it gave McQueen two Goodwill Notes, each of which 
provided for the recovery of attorney's fees. [Exs. 8, 11; Addendum at pp. 4 and 1]. Both 
Goodwill Notes were secured by a Deed of Trust [Ex. 9 included in the Addendum at p. 
9] which also provided for the recovery of McQueen's legal fees. McQueen filed a 
Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Expenses on November 3, 2008 [R. 3477] 
seeking recovery of attorney's fees under the Goodwill Notes and Trust Deed. The 
Guarantors executed a Guaranty, which guaranteed the payment of all amounts due under 
the Goodwill Notes or any other obligation of PC Crane. [Ex. 59, Addendum p. 15]. 
McQueen filed a Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Expenses Against Guarantors 
on December 19, 2008 [R. 3842] seeking recovery of legal fees from the Guarantors. 
Judge Reese entered an Order on Outstanding Motions on June 22, 2009 [R. 3933] which 
denied both the Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Expenses and the Motion for 
Award of Attorney's Fees and Expenses Against Guarantors. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The District Court's Award of Sanctions Should be Augmented. The 
District Court granted McQueen's Second Motion for Sanctions, which was based on 
defendants' and their counsel's pervasive efforts over an eight-month period to mislead 
23At the hearing of the Motion, McQueen's counsel requested that Judge Reese at a 
minimum order PC Crane and its counsel to pay all legal fees that McQueen incurred as a 
result of their misrepresentations and concealment concerning the subject trailer. [R. 
4003; T. 76-77]. 
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the Court and counsel and to conceal damaging evidence and facts. The District Court 
awarded as sanctions only $7,475.00 — the amount McQueen paid to present the Second 
Motion for Sanctions. The sanctions award should be augmented at least by the expense 
and attorney's fees McQueen incurred as a direct result of defendants' and their counsel's 
misrepresentations and discovery abuse. 
II. McQueen Should Recover Its Attorney's Fees Incurred in Defending 
Against PC Crane's Claims. PC Crane sued McQueen to escape liability under the 
Goodwill Notes and to "rescind" the Notes. McQueen should be awarded all of its 
attorney's fees below and on appeal because:
 f 
(A) The elements of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826 are present: (i) this 
case is based on contract(s), (ii) the contract(s) allow at least one party to recover 
attorney's fees, and (iii) PC Crane sought to recover its attorney's fees. 
(B) The Goodwill Notes allow recovery of attorney's fees in collection 
actions. PC Crane's suit to recover Promissory Note payments and to be relieved of 
future Note payments implicate the attorney's fee provision because (i) a suit to collect 
and a defense of a suit to avoid payment are in substance the same and (ii) under Utah law 
defense of an action to rescind a contract allowing for attorney's fees (which is what 
defendants did here) gives rise to recovery of attorney's fees. 
(C) The Trust Deed here authorizes recovery of attorney's fees under the 
exact circumstances presented here. 
(D) The Guaranty included a guarantee of PC Crane's liquidated or 
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unliquidated, absolute or contingent obligations to McQueen and allowed attorney's fees 
for its enforcement. McQueen's defense of PC Crane's effort to escape payment both for 
PC Crane and the Guarantors implicated the Guaranty's provisions allowing recovery of 
McQueen's legal fees. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE DISTRICT COURT'S AWARD OF SANCTIONS SHOULD BE 
AUGMENTED. 
Judge Reese granted McQueen's Second Motion for Sanctions but awarded 
McQueen only $7,475.00 — the attorney's fees incurred by McQueen in presenting the 
Second Motion for Sanctions. The standard of review on such an issue is abuse of 
discretion. E.g., Morton v. Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 274 (UT 1997). 
However, just like this Court, Judge Reese did not preside over PC Crane's discovery abuse — he 
reviewed it on the record after Judge Dever disqualified himself. That circumstance should 
lighten McQueen's burden of showing that Judge Reese's inadequate sanction should be 
reversed.2" 
This case is extraordinary. It presents a party's and a party's counsel's consistent 
perversion of the legal process over a long period, including multiple material 
misrepresentations to the Court and McQueen's counsel, all in an effort to hide facts, 
documents, and their adverse consequences. The effect of that misbehavior was over 
23In an analogous context, when the facts are not disputed, appellate courts do not 
give deference to the trial court's conclusions. E.g., State v. Seventy-Three Thousand 
One Hundred Thirty Dollars, 2001 UT 67, 31 P.3d 514. 
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eight months of expenses'and legal fees24 amounting to high multiple tens of thousands of 
dollars and then the cost of successfully pursuing the sanctions motion. The gross 
misbehavior presented here undermines the core of our system of justice. 
A. Our System of Justice Demands Honesty and Good Faith. Our 
procedural rules are aimed at securing "the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of 
every action." Rule 1(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The parties and their counsel 
are charged with achieving that goal with candor and an overriding duty to the integrity of 
the process. As concerns discovery, counsel are required to certify that the discovery 
request, response, or objection is "not interposed for any improper purpose, such as . . . to 
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation." A violation of that 
Rule subjects a lawyer to a sanction, which may include "an order to pay the amount of 
the reasonable expenses incurred because of the violation . . . ." Rule 26(g), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
Lawyers practicing in our system of justice are officers of the Court — they are not 
permitted to lie to the Court or opposing counsel, and they are not permitted to obstruct 
the process. They are, indeed, the system participants who are charged with putting the 
integrity of the system above their clients' individual interests. The Code of Professional 
Conduct ("RPC") makes this clear. A lawyer may not controvert any issue "unless there 
is a basis in law and fact for doing so." [Rule 3.1, RPC]. A lawyer must "make 
24This eight months of intense legal expense includes only the "trailer issue" — it 
does not include the expenses of disproving the Belchers' false testimony about not 
having spoken with Stam or their refusal to produce the Commission Agreement that they 
all testified existed. 
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reasonable efforts to expedite litigation." [Rule 3.2, RPC]. A lawyer may not knowingly 
"make a false statement of facts . . . to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of 
material fact. . . previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer." [Rule 3.3, RPC]. A 
lawyer may not "obstruct another party's access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy 
or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value." [Rule 3.4, 
RPC]. A lawyer may not "fail to make reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally 
proper discovery request." [Rule 3.4(d), RPC]. Comment 2 to Rule 3.3 states that the 
Rule "sets forth the special duties of lawyers as officers of the court to avoid conduct that 
undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process." Lawyers must be required to abide 
by these obligations if there is to be any hope that our judicial process will "secure the 
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." PC Crane's counsel 
violated each and every one of these sacred duties over and over again. If lawyers and 
parties are allowed to lie, obstruct, and hide evidence, the aspirations of our rules and 
judicial system are a fantasy. 
B. What Happened Here. As set forth in detail in the Statement of Facts 
above, PC Crane and its counsel, as the District Court found, over a long time and again 
and again took a false position on the existence of a trailer on which Stam and Belchers 
collaborated and modified. Their position changed only when the Court ordered 
discovery that would reveal their prior series of lies. The evident purpose was to prevent 
McQueen from being able to place before the Jury the facts that (i) PC Crane stated in 
materials given to its lender that it had collaborated with Stam on modifying a trailer and 
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(ii) the only trailer that was ever modified was modified in the February to April, 2005 
time frame — when Belchers and Stam all testified they didn't know each other. Instead, 
PC Crane and its counsel misled the Court and McQueen's counsel for eight months by 
claiming that there was a modified trailer on which Stam and Belchers collaborated, and 
that trailer was collaborated on and modified after December, 2005. 
Without restating the detailed evidence, here is a summary of those positions and 
their time line: 
Prior to the filing of this lawsuit [The Subject Modified Trailer Exists], PC 
Crane gave Bank of American Fork a document stating that PC Crane and Stam 
"collaborated on . . . the building of a custom designed trailer that gives us the ability to 
use our 300-ton hydraulic Liebherr crane as either a 300-ton crane or a 165-ton crane. 
This is the primary reason for the drastic increase in the annual revenue production of this 
machine." [Ex. 61, Addendum p. 20]. Thus, PC Crane told its bank that PC Crane and 
Stam had in fact "collaborated on" the building of a "custom designed trailer" that was 
"the primary reason for the drastic increase in the annual revenue production of this 
machine." The modified trailer existed. 
Early August 2007 to March 26, 2008. [The Subject Modified Trailer Existed, 
But Was Built After 2005.] In response to McQueen's Third Set of Interrogatories and 
Request for Production seeking information about who participated in construction of the 
trailer, the date the trailer was constructed, and documents bearing on those issues, PC 
Crane stated in their response dated August 7, 2007 that the discovery requests were 
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"overly broad, unduly burdensome [and] . . . not relevant." [R. 947]. 
McQueen moved to compel. PC Crane's counsel's ploy to assert that there was a 
modified trailer but it existed after the "relevant period" was brazen. In PC Crane's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Second Motion to Compel, PC Crane argued 
that McQueen had identified the relevant period of time to be prior to March, 2005.2^ 
[R. 996-98]. PC Crane went on to state, "McQueen specifically identifies this period of 
time as the 'relevant time period' for this action" and that "[e]ven though Plaintiffs 
believe the records concerning the subject trailer are not relevant to the issues in this case, 
they are willing to respond to the Discovery Requests if limited to the relevant time 
* 
period of October, 2004 to March, 2005." [R. 997-98]. They then argued that McQueen 
was being unreasonable in refusing to limit the time frame of discovery requests and 
argued that the Court should limit McQueen's discovery to the relevant time period and 
deny the Second Motion to Compel. [R. 998]. PC Crane thus conceded the existence of 
"the subject trailer," but asked the Court to not require them to produce information about 
it if it was "outside the relevant time period." 
At the hearing of the Motion to Compel, PC Crane's counsel told the Court, with 
respect to the collaborated trailer, "This trailer, Your Honor, as we certified in a letter, 
this collaboration occurred much after the purchase of the fourth crane in April of 2005. 
It was well into the year 2006." He further stated, "The trailer wasn't even conceived of 
until the year 2006 between Stam and the Belchers. At that time, a year and a half after 
25This mischaracterizes McQueen's position as to the date - the transaction closed 
in April, 2005. 
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they purchased the first cranes, there clearly is no relevance to their collaboration on this 
trailer." [R. 4001, T. 50-52]. 
On November 2, 2007, the Court entered an Order which required production of 
all documents relating to the trailer prior to December, 2005 [Order on Motion to Quash 
and Motions to Compel, Paragraph 2(e); R. 1096]. In response, PC Crane's counsel 
communicated that Belchers "have no responsive documents." [R. 2301]. McQueen then 
sent its Fourth Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production requesting that PC Crane 
identify all trailers it owned of the kind that was modified. PC Crane objected on the 
grounds that the request was "overly broad, unduly burdensome, and seeks information 
that is not relevant."26 [R. 1555]. It also objected on the ground that it sought 
information "outside of the scope of discovery authorized by the Court." Naturally, if 
there were no trailer modified after the Court's cutoff date of December, 2005, this 
objection would have made no sense and would have been improperly asserted. 
McQueen's counsel then wrote PC Crane's counsel advising that McQueen had 
independently verified the existence of a trailer modified prior to December, 2005 and 
stated: 
We intend to seek sanctions if the documents relating to this trailer 
. . . are not immediately forthcoming. When we do, and when this 
matter plays out, we do not want you or your client to be able to say 
that there was some innocent mistake made. You and your client are 
on notice that the trailer in question was made and titled during the 
time period for which production was ordered by the Court. If these 
26What could be more relevant than the fact that PC Crane modified only one such 
trailer? How burdensome can it be to state: "PC Crane owned only one drop-deck trailer 
— the Fontaine"? 
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documents are not produced now, in response to this very pointed 
request, it will be clear that they have been intentionally withheld. 
[R. 2309]. 
PC Crane's counsel responded that PC Crane had "no documents relating to the 
manufacture of the 'custom designed trailer' prior to December, 2005." [R. 2512]. 
McQueen then filed its Third Motion to Compel on December 13, 2007 seeking 
production of the withheld information. PC Crane stated that it objected because the 
request "sought information outside the scope of discovery authorized by the Court" [that 
is, after December 31, 2005] and indignantly stated that McQueen's effort to determine 
whether PC Crane was "intentionally withholding documents with respect to the trailer" 
was "unsubstantiated" and improper. [R. 1633-34]. At the hearing of that Motion, PC 
Crane's counsel told the Court that PC Crane and Stam did collaborate on a trailer but 
"there just aren't any documents." He stated that the trailer referred to in the Bank 
Disclosure (i.e., the trailer on which Stam and Belchers collaborated) was for a different 
crane. [R. 4002; T. 38-39]. 
Finally, the District Court in its Order on Third Motion to Compel dated March 20, 
2008 required PC Crane to supply all documents reflecting work done to modify any drop 
deck trailers owned by PC Crane prior to December 31, 2005 and to allow McQueen to 
depose PC Crane's principals on the subject of work done to modify any drop deck 
trailer. [R. 2081]. 
March 26, 2008 to Present. [There was Never a Subject Modified Trailer]. 
Now being forced to produce information by deposition and document requests 
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concerning modification of any drop deck trailer, PC Crane's counsel reversed their many 
statements over the past eight months — instead of continuing to represent and certify that 
the "subject trailer" had been built long after December, 2005, PC Crane now took the 
position that "the trailer . . . was never actually built." [R. 2334]. The Bank Disclosure 
stated that the subject modified trailer gave PC Crane "the ability to use our 300 ton . . . 
crane as either a 300 ton crane or a 165 ton crane." [Ex. 61. See p. 20 in Addendum]. 
The second-round depositions of Stam and Belchers demonstrated that, as outlined in 
greater detail above, PC Crane modified only one trailer, which was modified through the 
addition of a third axle and changing the axle spacing of the other axle so that the trailer 
could carry more weight. [D. Belcher Depo., R. 2342]. The modifications to this trailer 
were effectuated between March 9 and April 8, 2005 (the second crane transaction closed 
later in April, 2005). [V. Belcher Depo., R. 2348-49]. Stam testified that the modified 
trailer could haul counterweights for both the 165-ton and 300-ton cranes and that the 
modified trailer was in fact used with counterweights for both cranes. [Stam Depo., 
R. 2355].
 0 
Following, in black and white, are some of PC Crane and its counsel's statements 
over an 8-month period, which cannot be squared with their present position that there 
was never any trailer modified in collaboration with Stam. It will dispel any concern that 
PC Crane and its counsel did not over a long period intentionally mislead and 
misrepresent to evade discovery. 
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PC Crane's Statements Observations 
"One of the operational decisions that we 
[PC Crane] and Lon [Stam] collaborated on 
was in the building of a custom designed 
trailer that gives us the ability to use our 
300-ton hydraulic Liebherr crane as either a 
300-ton crane or a 165-ton crane. This is 
the primary reason for the drastic increase 
in the annual revenue production of this 
machine." [Bank Disclosure, Ex. 61, 
Addendum at pp. 20]. 
In response to McQueen's discovery 
requesting information concerning dates of 
construction of the subject trailer and who 
participated in its modification, PC Crane 
on August 7, 2007 objected stating that the 
request was "overly broad, unduly 
burdensome, and irrelevant." [R. 2273-75]. 
In response to Maak's request for 
production of information concerning the 
subject trailer, Burghardt stated on August 
13, 2007: "During the relevant time period, 
PC Crane and Mr. Stam had no 
communications or interaction concerning 
the subject trailer." [R. 2281]. 
In its response to McQueen's Motion to 
Compel filed August 30, 2007, PC Crane 
stated: "Even though plaintiffs believe the 
records concerning the subject trailer are 
not relevant to the issues in this case . . . ." 
[R. 2293]. 
Obviously, if the "custom designed 
trailer" was "the primary reason" for a 
drastic increase in revenue, the trailer 
existed. Now PC Crane says it never 
existed. 
If there was no such trailer, PC Crane 
would have said so and candor 
required that it do so if it were true. If 
there was in fact no such trailer, 
responding to the request would 
obviously not be "unduly burdensome" 
and certainly not irrelevant. PC 
Crane's counsel, when they signed the 
response containing those false 
objections, certified that they were 
warranted. Rule 26(g), U.R.C.P. 
Burghardt's communication clearly 
assumes the existence of the subject 
trailer — it would have made no sense 
to say what he did if there were no 
such "subject trailer." This is 
particularly so given that PC Crane's 
counsel told the Court that there was 
"collaboration" on modifying the 
subject trailer. [See paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 
9, and 10 below.] 
Clearly, PC Crane's statement that the 
records concerning the subject trailer 
are not relevant is inconsistent with the 
non-existence of the subject trailer. 
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Burghardt stated to the District Court on 
September 5, 2007: 'This trailer. Your 
Honor, as we certified in a letter, this 
collaboration occurred much after the 
purchase of the fourth crane in April of 
2005. It was well into the year 2006. * * * 
"The trailer wasn't even conceived of until 
the year 2006 " Later, he stated, "At 
that time, a year and a half after they 
purchased the first cranes, there is clearly no 
relevance to their collaboration on this 
trailer." [R. 4001, T. 50-52]. 
In his letter dated December 10, 2007, 
Burghardt told Maak, in response to Maak's 
request for production of documents 
relating to the trailer, the following: 
"Documents showing when the original 
unmodified trailer was created have 
absolutely no relevance to this inquiry. The 
original trailer was apparently manufactured 
well before PC Crane was created and well 
before PC Crane began dealing with your 
client or ever met Lon Stam. We believe 
that the Court's Order addresses the 
manufacture of the customized trailer and 
not the manufacture of the original 
unmodified trailer." [R. 2312-13], 
At the hearing on March 4, 2008, the focus 
of attention was whether the trailer 
modified in March 2005 was the Stam-
collaborated trailer or whether the one 
modified after December 31, 2005 was the 
Stam-collaborated trailer. The District 
Court asked Barneck how McQueen was to 
know which trailer was the subject 
customized trailer. [R. 4002, T. 53]. 
Barneck suggested that McQueen's efforts 
in this regard was "a witch hunt" based on 
"unfounded suspicions that we have been 
Burghardt's statement that "this 
trailer" occurred after April of 2005 — 
well into 2006 — and that there was 
collaboration on "this trailer" cannot 
be squared with his present claim that 
such a trailer never existed. 
Burghardt's refusal to produce 
documents relating to the "original 
unmodified trailer" because the 
Court's Order was limited to the 
customizing of this trailer plainly 
suggests that there was such a trailer 
that was customized. Why didn't he 
say that there was no such trailer? 
Because PC Crane wanted to tell the 
Jury that the subject trailer was 
modified in collaboration with Stam in 
2006. 
How can a lawyer in a very extended 
hearing address again and again the 
Court's and counsel's concerns about 
which trailer is the one modified with 
Stam [the one modified in March 2005 
or the one PC Crane then claimed was 
modified in 2006] and NEVER SAY 
THAT HIS CLIENT ASSERTED 
THAT THERE WAS NO SUCH 
TRAILER? How can a lawyer tell the 
Court that "with respect to these 
trailers," was the Court asking PC 
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hiding or destroying documents or lying." 
[Id.] After significant discussion, the 
District Court stated: "It appears to me that 
the plaintiffs should produce copies of the 
information concerning the modification of 
whatever trailer was done to establish 
whether or not it was the same trailer that's 
at issue . . . ." [R. 4002; T. 66]. Maak 
explained that the problem was that PC 
Crane claimed that the subject trailer was 
different from the one modified in mid-
April 2005, and McQueen needed to know 
what trailer PC Crane claimed was the one 
modified with Stam. [R. 4002; T. 72-75]. 
Barneck stated: "But with respect to these 
trailers. Judge, we can certainly — I 
understood what the Court intended from 
the ruling, and this is almost a question by 
way of clarification was to produce records 
relating to any trailers from March to December 
of '05 so it can be shown whether or not those 
are the one that was referenced in [the Bank 
Disclosure!." [R. 4002; T. 75]. 
In response to McQueen's Third Motion to 
Compel seeking documents relating to any 
trailer modified by PC Crane, PC Crane on 
January 4, 2005 stated that it objected to the 
request "because it sought information 
outside the scope of discovery authorized by 
the Court" - i.e., after December, 2005. 
[R. 1633-34, «|ffl 37-38]. 
Barneck stated to the Court on March 4, 
2008 that PC Crane did collaborate on a 
trailer with Stam, but then explained that the 
trailer on which they collaborated was for a 
different crane than the one referred to in 
PC Crane's document described in 
paragraph 1: He stated: "PC Crane wanted 
a drop-deck trailer like this, they wanted to 
create one. This was for a different crane. 
Crane to produce records concerning the 
March to December 2005 trailer "so it can 
be shown whether or not those are the one 
that was referenced in the Bank 
Disclosure." HOW CAN BARNECK 
CONTINUE TALKING ABOUT MORE 
THAN ONE CUSTOMIZED TRAILER 
WHEN HE KNEW THERE WAS 
ONLY ONE? Is this candor to the 
Court and counsel? 
How can a request for information on 
a modified trailer relate to a period 
after the date the Court allowed 
(December, 2005) if no trailer was 
modified after December, 2005? 
How can Barneck truthfully state that 
the "other one" [trailer] that Maak is 
complaining about "from the loan 
documents" [the subject trailer] was 
for the 300-ton crane if there was no 
such trailer? 
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It was for the 165 Liebherr. The other one 
that Counsel's complaining about from the 
loan documents was for the 300. Different 
crane." [R. 4002; T. 39]. 
10. PC Crane's counsel told the District Court Now they say that there was only one 
that there were two modified trailers — one modified trailer — that the other one 
modified in March, 2005 and the other never existed. One or the other 
"custom designed trailer." [R. 2427-28, statement is necessarily false. 
TIT 30, 36]. 
So, for 8 months, PC Crane and its counsel resisted producing documents relating 
to the modified trailer again and again claiming that it was irrelevant because the subject 
Stam-collaborated modification occurred after December 31, 2005 and never stated, as 
they now do, the absolutely inconsistent position that no such trailer ever existed. After 
the Court required PC Crane to produce documents that would demonstrate that they had 
been misrepresenting all along as indicated above, Burghardt wrote Maak a letter stating 
that: "The trailer mentioned in those documents [the document identified in Paragraph 1 
above] was never actually built." Either PC Crane and its counsel were untruthful in the 
above 10 examples or they are untruthful now. There is no other possibility. 
The foregoing course of events establishes, in black and white, that PC Crane and 
its counsel repeatedly misrepresented to the Court and counsel that there was a trailer on 
which Stam and Belchers collaborated, which was in fact built and modified long after 
December, 2005. They did this so as to prevent McQueen from arguing at trial that the 
only trailer that was modified was modified before the second crane transaction and that, 
therefore, this was the trailer referred to in the Bank of American Fork documents on 
which Belchers and Stam collaborated prior to the second crane transaction — and that, 
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therefore, Stam and Belchers did not testify truthfully when they stated that they did not 
know each other during this time period. The duration, multiplicity of lies, and 
circumstances leave no room to claim that this was an honest mistake. It was plainly 
purposeful deception. 
C. What is the Appropriate Sanction? It has been demonstrated through 
incontestible documents and transcripts that PC Crane and its counsel over an 8-month 
period obstructed discovery and lied about the trailer on which Stam and Belchers 
collaborated. Why did they do this? Because if they admitted either (i) that the trailer that 
was in fact modified and customized was one on which they collaborated or (ii) that the 
trailer that was modified and customized was the only trailer that was modified and 
customized, they would establish a fact that would destroy their case — the fact that 
Belchers were involved with Stam in their business before the second crane transaction 
and, therefore, their claims and sworn testimony that they didn't know Stam or of his role 
in the business prior to the second transaction were all false. PC Crane and its counsel 
made a conscious decision to attempt to preserve the baseless, false position that there was 
another modified trailer which was modified long after December, 2005, which was the 
one referred to in the documents given to Bank of American Fork. This fact is undeniably 
and now admittedly a lie. It was obviously perpetrated to gain strategic advantage and to 
keep this critical, damning evidence from McQueen. In doing so, PC Crane and its 
counsel violated the solemn duties of lawyers under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
Code of Professional Responsibility to allow cases to be decided on the evidence and on 
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their merits rather than based upon concealment and contrived falsehoods. What is the 
appropriate sanction for such behavior? If the sanction is limited to the cost of making the 
Motion for Sanctions only, there is no significant disadvantage to engaging in such 
behavior. If you're caught, you lose a few thousand dollars in legal fees; if you're not 
caught, then you win by your deceptive gamesmanship. 
McQueen asked the District Court before trial to dismiss PC Crane's case with 
prejudice for these abuses. Judge Reese heard the motion after trial and awarded only 
McQueen's sanction motion costs. McQueen asked Judge Reese at a minimum order PC 
Crane and its counsel to pay all legal fees that McQueen incurred as a result of their 
misrepresentations and concealment concerning the subject trailer. [R. 4003; T. 76-77]. 
Under the Court's sanction award, McQueen was uncompensated for about 8 months of 
intense lawyering involving multiple supplemental sets of interrogatories and requests for 
production, two Motions to Compel and briefing and arguing same, four supplemental 
depositions, extensive correspondence, hiring private investigators, etc. The resultant fees 
and expenses dwarf the 7,000-odd dollar cost of that Motion for Sanctions. Under the 
sanction imposed by the District Court, McQueen must bear all of those expenses, which 
were caused by the palpably wrongful, dishonest behavior of PC Crane. It bears 
reemphasis that because of the disqualification of Judge Dever, Judge Reese did not 
preside over the abuse that he found in granting the Second Motion for Sanctions. He, like 
this Court, was required to decide the Motion on the record. That fact should lighten 
McQueen's burden to show that the minimal sanction imposed by Judge Reese was an 
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abuse of discretion. 
Research has not disclosed any case of discovery abuse remotely approaching this 
shocking case. Utah appellate decisions hold that a party's conduct merits sanctions if any 
of the following circumstances are found: (i) The party's misbehavior was wilful, (ii) a 
party acted in bad faith, (iii) a court can attribute some fault to the party, or (iv) the party 
has engaged in persistent dilatory tactics tending to frustrate the judicial process. Morton 
v. Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271 (UT 1997). Here, each and every element set 
forth in Morton is present in spades. The ultimate sanction of dismissal has been 
repeatedly approved for behavior dramatically less culpable and harmful to the system 
than that presented here. Tuck v. Godfrey, 1999 UT App. 127, 981 P.2d 407, cert, denied, 
984 P.2d 1023 (UT 1999) [finding that a party had wilfully obstructed discovery supported 
the court's decision to impose default as a discovery sanction]; Schoney v. Memorial 
Estates, Inc., 790 P.2D 584, cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232; W. W. and W.B. Gardner v. Park 
West Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 734 (UT 1977) [default appropriate where there was 
frustration of the legal process]. 
Rule 37(b)(2) authorizes the Court on sanctions to "take such action in regard to the 
failure as are just." These authorized sanctions include awarding "the reasonable 
attorney's fees, caused by the failure." Rule 37(b)(2)(D). These Rules suggest that the 
sanction be fair ("just") and that the expense suffered by the opposing party should be 
compensated absent some countervailing justification for the misbehavior. How can it be 
fair or "just" for McQueen to bear the enormous burden of eight months of lawyering that 
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was directly caused by defendants' gross misbehavior? McQueen respectfully submits that 
any sanction that leaves McQueen uncompensated for at least the direct economic damage 
that was inflicted by PC Crane and its counsel's bad faith, dishonest behavior is an abuse 
of discretion. In addition, this Court should direct the District Court to impose an 
additional sanction amount upon defendants and/or their counsel to deter like conduct in 
the future. Marshall v. Marshall, 915 P.2d 508 (UT App. 1996) (discovery sanctions are 
intended to deter misconduct). 
ii. MCQUEEN SHOULD RECOVER ITS ATTORNEY'S FEES 
INCURRED IN DEFENDING AGAINST PC CRANE'S CLAIMS. 
McQueen seeks to recover attorney's fees from PC Crane and the Guarantors based 
upon (A) Utah Code Ann., § 78B-5-826, (B) the Goodwill Notes, (C) the Trust Deed, and 
(D) the Guaranty. 
A. McQueen is Entitled to Recover Attorney's Fees Under Section 
78B-5-826. 
Utah Code Ann., § 78B-5-826 providesas follows: 
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party that 
prevails in a civil action based upon any promissory note, written 
contract, or other writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the 
provisions of the promissory note, written contract, or other writing 
allow at least one party to recover attorney's fees. 
This Court in Hooban v. Unicity International Inc., 2009 UT App. 287, held that 
for this provision to be applicable, only the following must be established: "[F]irst, the 
underlying litigation must be based on a contract; and second, the contract must allow at 
least one party to recover attorney fees." Id. at <|j 9. This Court stated: "The statute does 
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not require that the contract or its provisions actually be enforceable under the theory 
advanced in the lawsuit, (citation omitted). Instead, 'the language of the statute focuses 
on the provisions of the writing rather than its legal effect' and 'requires only that a party 
to the litigation assert the [contract's] enforceability as a basis for recovery'." Id. 
Here, McQueen prevailed on all accounts, and both elements are established — as to 
the first, the Goodwill Notes, Trust Deed, and Guaranty each "allow at least one party to 
recover attorney's fees."27 As to the second, PC Crane in the prayer of its Complaint 
sought recovery of attorney's fees from McQueen.28 The statute is therefore applicable 
and this Court should remand the case to the District Court for a determination of the 
amount of McQueen attorney's fees. 
B. McQueen is Entitled to Recover Legal Fees Under the Goodwill Notes. 
PC Crane asserts that the Goodwill Notes were the $228,000 Note and the $177,600 
Note.29 The $228,000.00 Goodwill Note at Paragraph 2 provides as follows: 
2. Default. Time is of the essence of this Promissory 
Note. A default shall occur under this Promissory Note if: 
2.1 Failure to Make Payments. Maker [PC Crane] 
fails to make any payment under this Promissory Note on the due date 
of such payment. 
Paragraph 3, "Remedies," provides that "[i]n the event of a default under this Promissory 
27The precise provisions in each document are addressed below. 
28See paragraph 4 of prayer of Complaint. [R. 25]. 
29Paragraph 5 of PC Crane's Statement of Facts (PC Crane Memorandum in 
Opposition to Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees [R. 3563-64]). 
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Note, McQueen may take any of the following actions, which includes an action to collect 
the Notes and recover all costs and reasonable attorney's fees in connection therewith." 
[Ex. 11; Addendum at p. 1]. The $177,600.00 Goodwill Note [Ex. 8, Addendum at p. 4] 
has the same provisions. 
Thus, both Goodwill Notes provide that in the event of default, an action can be 
filed to collect the Notes and recover all costs and reasonable attorney's fees. PC Crane 
argued below that the Notes' provisions were inapplicable because (i) PC Crane never 
failed to make a payment (and that its suing to recover payments already made was not 
equivalent to failing to make a payment), and (ii) that McQueen never filed an action to 
collect the Goodwill Notes (and that McQueen's defense against PC Crane's action to 
avoid liability under the Goodwill Notes did not constitute such an action). Neither 
argument has merit. 
With respect to the first, the Court should not frustrate the parties' evident intent by 
interpreting the provision here to allow PC Crane to avoid its liability for legal fees by 
making payments under the Goodwill Notes and concurrently suing to recover them and to 
be relieved of making future payments.30 As to the second, whether PC Crane sues to 
avoid liability or McQueen sues to enforce liability does not change the substance of the 
case — only the alignment of the parties differs. Similarly, there is no difference in 
30The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires that parties not 
purposely do anything which will injure the other party's right to receive the fruits of the 
contract. E.g., Bastian v. Cedar Hills Inv. & Land Co., 632 P.2d 818, 821 (UT 1981). 
Suing to escape exactly what the Goodwill Notes required is, plainly, a breach of that 
covenant, and the attorney's fee provisions should not be narrowly interpreted to reward 
PC Crane for breaching that covenant. 
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substance between a refusal to make a payment and the making of a payment and suing for 
its recovery — both require litigation to collect. PC Crane, which itself asserted the right to 
recover its own attorney's fees based upon the parties' agreements, should not be allowed 
to wiggle out of its own responsibility through a hypertechnical interpretation contrived 
after it lost. 
Moreover, Utah law is clear that if a contract allows recovery of legal fees in a suit 
to enforce a contract, fees are also recoverable when a party defends against a suit to avoid 
enforcement of that contract. Deja Vue, Inc. v. United States Energy Corp., 1999 UT App. 
355, 993 P.2d 222. That is precisely what happened here. In Chase v. Scott, 2001 UT 
App. 404, 38 P.3d 1001, plaintiff sued to rescind a contract allowing recovery of 
attorney's fees in "litigation to enforce" the contract. The trial court awarded the fees to 
the defendant. On appeal, plaintiff argued the defendant's defense was not a claim to 
enforce the contract as the fee provision required, but rather a defense to a rescission 
claim, which literally was true. Plaintiff there, like PC Crane, also argued that there was 
no default under the contract because it was fully performed. The Utah Court of Appeals 
affirmed the fee award, reasoning that when the plaintiff "sued to rescind the [c]ontract, 
the ensuing defense was Mitigation to enforce' the [c]ontract." Id. at \ 17. Accordingly, 
"[b]ecause [the defendants] were successful in their defense of the [c]ontract, [the court] 
upheld the award of costs and attorney's fees." Id. The court rejected the claim that there 
was no liability for fees because the contract was fully performed, noting: "Chase cites no 
legal authority for the proposition, and we find it unconvincing." 2001 UT App. 404, ^ 13, 
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n. 2. Here, just like in Chase, PC Crane sued to "rescind" and recover all payments under 
the Goodwill Notes [Complaint, Prayer; R. 24-25, Iffl 1, 2, 3], which allow recovery of fees 
for "collection and enforcement of the Promissory Note(s)" and claimed that it had folly 
performed by making all Note payments. McQueen successfully defended with the result 
being that the contract and Notes were not rescinded and McQueen was entitled to keep 
the payments PC Crane made under the Goodwill Notes. 
These parties both contemplated that if there were litigation about the Goodwill 
Notes, the prevailing party would recover its attorney's fees. Indeed, PC Crane's own 
prayer for relief seeks recovery of those very attorney's fees had it prevailed. Now having 
lost, PC Crane argues that there was never a right to attorney's fees at all. If, as PC Crane 
alleged in its Complaint, it was entitled to recover its legal fees from McQueen if it won, 
then it follows that McQueen is entitled to recover its attorney's fees when PC Crane lost. 
C. The Trust Deed Mandates Recovery of Legal Expenses. 
The Trust Deed was given to secure all amounts owed under the Notes, the payment 
and performance of each agreement of Lacy under the Trust Deed, and the payments of all 
sums expended by McQueen pursuant to Paragraphs 2(d), (e), and (f) of the Trust Deed. 
[Ex. 9; Addendum at p. 9]. The Trust Deed further provides in Paragraph 4 that McQueen 
may "commence, appear and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the 
security hereof or the rights or powers of [McQueen] and in exercising any such powers, 
incur any liability, expend whatever amounts in its absolute discretion it may deem 
necessary therefor, including costs of evidence of title, employ counsel, and pay counsel's 
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reasonable fees." Under each of the following two independent bases, McQueen is 
entitled to recover its attorney's fees under the Trust Deed: 
First, the Trust Deed secures payment of all amounts owed under the two Goodwill 
Notes. Paragraph 4 provides that McQueen may, among other things, "defend any action 
or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof or the rights or powers of 
[McQueen] . . . ." By suing McQueen in this case to extinguish the debt secured by the 
Trust Deed, that provision was implicated and McQueen was entitled to defend this action, 
which "affect[ed] the security [of the Trust Deed] or the rights . . . of [McQueen]." 
Second, PC Crane in this action moved the Court to force McQueen to reconvey the 
Trust Deed in this case [R. 2165]. McQueen expended significant effort, albeit 
unsuccessfully,31 to avoid being forced to reconvey the Trust Deed.32 PC Crane's motion 
to force McQueen to reconvey its Trust Deed unquestionably constituted "any action or 
proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof or the rights or powers of [McQueen]." 
Under both circumstances, McQueen was entitled, under Paragraph 4 of the Trust Deed, to 
"expend whatever amounts in its absolute discretion it may deem necessary therefor, 
including costs of evidence of title, employ counsel, and pay counsel's reasonable fees." 
Those amounts are owed under the Trust Deed. 
3
'The Trust Deed provides for the recovery of attorney's fees by McQueen 
irrespective of whether the effort was successful. 
32For example, McQueen filed a memorandum opposing PC Crane's motion [R. 
2198] and filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Utah Supreme Court [R. 2786]. 
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D. Liability of Guarantors. 
The Guarantors executed a Guaranty [Ex. 59; Addendum at p. 15], which 
guaranteed "the prompt and full payment of all sums now or hereinafter due pursuant to 
said Notes or otherwise due any of the Creditors [McQueen] by Borrower [PC Crane] 
pursuant to the Notes and any other debt or obligation of Borrower, notwithstanding 
whether said debt is primary or secondary, or whether said debt is liquidated or 
unliquidated, absolute or contingent." Thus, to the extent that there is liability for 
attorney's fees under the Notes and/or Trust Deed, there is also liability under the 
Guaranty. In addition, the Guaranty's language quoted above is broader than the 
provisions of the Goodwill Notes. The Guaranty's covenant that the Guarantors would 
promptly and fully pay (not sue to be relieved of payment)33 all sums now or hereafter due 
. . . whether absolute or contingent" is clearly violated by the Guarantors' suit to recover 
past and escape liability for future payments. McQueen's defense sought recovery of all 
amounts under the Goodwill Notes, which constituted either or all of (i) a payment under 
the Notes, or (ii) a debt or obligation of PC Crane whether "primary or secondary," 
"liquidated or unliquidated, absolute or contingent." The Guaranty provides for recovery 
of "all reasonable attorney's fees and costs necessary for the enforcement of this 
Guaranty." This attorney's fee provision is applicable to McQueen's effort to seek 
enforcement of the Guaranty. Under the Guaranty, therefore, the Court should find that 
the Guarantors are liable for an award of all attorney's fees incurred by McQueen in this 
33The covenant of good faith and fair dealing applies as well to the Guaranty. See 
note 30, supra. 
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case. 
CONCLUSION 
McQueen requests the following relief on appeal: 
1. As to the Sanctions, that this Court rule that plaintiffs and their counsel are 
liable to McQueen as sanctions in the amount of all costs, expenses and attorney's fees 
incurred by McQueen as a result of plaintiffs' misrepresentations and discovery abuse 
concerning the trailer including that aspect of this appeal and an appropriate additional 
amount to deter similar future behavior, and remand to the District Court for a 
determination of the amount thereof. 
2. As to PC Crane's liability for attorney's fees, that this Court rule that PC 
Crane is liable to McQueen for all costs, expenses and attorney's fees incurred by 
McQueen in this action including appeal, and remand to the District Court for a 
determination of the amount thereof. 
3. As to the Guarantors' liability for attorney's fees, that this Court rule that 
David Paul Belcher, Vernon Belcher, and Lacy LLC are jointly and severally liable to 
McQueen for all costs, expenses and attorney's fees incurred by McQueen in this action 
including appeal, and remand to the District Court for a determination of the amount 
thereof. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of March, 2010. 
Maak, Of Counsel 
BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
50 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS was served 
this IO day of March, 2010 by mailing on said date two copies thereof by United 
States mail, first class postage prepaid, addressed to: 
Matthew C. Barneck, Esq. 
Paul P. Burghardt, Esq. 
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees 
299 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2465 
51 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ADDENDUM 
Table of Contents 
2004 Goodwill Note [Ex. 11] Addendum 001 
2005 Goodwill Note [Ex. 8] Addendum 004 
Deed of Trust [Ex. 9] Addendum 009 
Guaranty [Ex. 59] Addendum 015 
Draft "Option to Purchase" [PC 697-98] Addendum 016 
Excerpts from Bank Disclosure [Ex. 61] Addendum 018 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
PROMISSORY NOTE 
$228,800.00 Salt Lake City, Utah 
{
 October 18,2004 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, PC CRANE SERVICE LIMITED 
LIABILITY COMPANY, a Utah limited liability company (referred to herein as "Maker"), 
promises to pay to the order of MCQUEEN CRANE SERVICES, LLC, a Utah limited 
liability company, Central Equipment, LC, a Utah limited liability company, and McQueen 
Masonry, Inc., a Utah corporation (collectively "Holders"), at such place within the United 
States as Holders may designate from time to time, at the time and in the manner hereinafter 
stipulated, the principal sum of TWO HUNDRED TWENTY-EIGHT THOUSAND EIGHT 
HUNDRED DOLLARS AND NO CENTS ($228,800.00) (the "Original Principal Amount") 
plus interest as provided herein. 
I. Interest and Payment. 
1.1. Interest Rate. Amounts owed under this Promissory Note (the "Loan") 
shall bear interest at the rate often percent (10%) per annum, compounded annually. 
1.2. Payment. Maker shall repay the principal and interest owing under this 
Promissory Note as follows: Maker shall make thirty-six (36) equal and consecutive monthly 
payments of $4,391.32 each to Holders beginning on October 30, 2004, and continuing on the 
same day of each following month, through and including September 30, 2007. On October 
30, 2007 (the "Maturity Date"), Maker shall make a single lump sum payment to Holders of 
the entire remaining balance of the Original Principal Amount plus accrued interest 
($123,389.74). Payments made hereunder shall be made in lawful money of the United States 
of America. 
1.3. Prepayment. Maker shall be permitted to prepay all or any portion of 
the amounts owing under this Promissory Note prior to the Maturity Date without penalty and 
without the prior written consent of the Holders. 
1.4. Place and Time of Payment. All payments specified herein shall be 
deemed made when actually received by Holders. 
2. Default. Time is of the essence of this Promissory Note. A default shall occur 
under this Promissory Note if: 
2.1. Failure to Make Payments. Maker fails to make any payment under this 
Promissory Note on the date due of such payment. 
2.2. Bankruptcy. Maker, or any of the individuals referred to herein as 
Maker, becomes insolvent, a receiver is appointed to take possession of all or a substantial 
part of Maker's properties, Maker makes an assignment for the benefit of creditors or files a 
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voluntary petition in bankruptcy or Maker is the subject of an involuntary petition in 
bankruptcy that is not dismissed within 60 days. 
2.3. Note. A payment default occurs under that certain other promissory 
note of Maker, in favor of Central Equipment, LC, a Utah limited liability company and 
McQueen Masonry, Inc., a Utah corporation, dated the same day as this Promissory Note, in 
the original principal amount of $139,450.00; that goes uncorrected after 15 days written 
notice of the default; 
2.4. Deed of Trust. A default in that deed of trust granted by Maker in 
favor of Holders to secure the payment of this Promissory Note; 
2.5. Security Agreement. A default in that security agreement granted by 
Maker in favor of Holders to secure payment of this Promissory Note 
3. Remedies. In the event of a default under this Promissory Note, Holders, at 
their option, may take any one or more of the following actions: 
3.1. Acceleration and Legal Action. Declare the entire unpaid principal 
balance of the debt evidenced hereby, and all interest on such debt and all other costs and 
expenses evidenced hereby, to be immediately due and payable, notwithstanding any other 
provision hereof, and commence legal action for collection and enforcement of the Promissory 
Note, including all costs and reasonable attorneys fees incurred in connection therewith. 
3.2. Other Remedies. Pursue any other right or remedy provided herein or 
otherwise allowed by law. Holders may pursue any such rights or remedies singly, together or 
successively. Exercise of any such right or remedy shall not be deemed an election of 
remedies. Failure to exercise any right or remedy shall not be deemed a waiver of any 
existing or subsequent default nor a waiver of any such right or remedy. 
4. Governing Law, Severability. 
4 .1 . Governing Law. This Promissory Note has been executed under and 
shall be construed and enforced in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah. 
4.2. Severability. If any provision of this Promissory Note is found by a 
court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid or unenforceable as written, then the parties 
intend and desire that (a) such provision shall be enforceable to the M l extent permitted by 
law and (b) the invalidity or unenforceability of such provision shall not affect the validity and 
enforceability of the remainder of this Promissory Note. 
5, Amendment. This Promissory Note may not be amended, modified or 
changed, nor shall any provision hereof be deemed waived, except only by an instrument in 
writing signed by the party against whom enforcement of any such waiver, amendment, 
change or modification is sought. 
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6. Binding Agreement. This Promissory Note shall be binding upon the 
successors and assigns of Maker. 
7. • Security. The payment of this Promissory Note is secured by a deed of trust 
and a security agreement, each dated the same date as this Promissory Note. 
This Promissory Note is intended to be effective as of the date and year first above 
written. 
PC CRANE SERVICE LIMITED 
LIABILITY COMPANY, a Utah limited 
liability company 
Titlery PvAq^^siW* K X ^ ^ ^ ^ C ^ -
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PROMISSORY NOTE 
$177,600.00 Salt Lake City, Utah 
March21,2005 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, PC C R A N E SERVICE LIMITED 
LIABILITY COMPANY, a Utah limited liability company (referred to herein as "Maker"), 
promises to pay to the order of McQueen Masonry, a Utah corporation ("Holder"), at such 
place within the United States as Holder may designate from time to time, at the time and in 
the manner hereinafter stipulated, the principal sum of ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY-SEVEN 
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED DOLLARS AND NO CENTS ($177,600.00) (the "Original 
Principal Amount") plus interest as provided herein. 
L Interest and Payment. 
1.1. Interest Rate. Amounts owed under this Promissory Note (the "Loan") 
shall bear interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum. 
1.2. Payment. Maker shall repay the principal and interest owing under this 
Promissory Note as follows: Maker shall make thirty-five (35) equal and consecutive monthly 
payments of Two Thousand One Hundred Twenty-Two Dollars and 46/100 ($2,122.46) each 
to Holder beginning on May 1, 2005 and continuing on the same day of each following 
month, through and including March 1, 2008. On April 1, 2008, Maker shall make a single 
lump sum payment to Holder of the entire remaining balance of the Original Principal 
Amount plus accrued interest ($152,879.31). Such payment shall be in lawful money of the 
United States of America and when received by Holder shall constitute full and final payment 
of all amounts owed hereunder. 
1.3. Prepayment. Maker shall be permitted to prepay all or any portion of 
the amounts owing under this Promissory Note prior to the Maturity Date without penalty and 
without the prior written consent of the Holder. 
1.4. Place and Time of Payment. All payments specified herein shall be 
deemed made when actually received by Holder. 
2. Default. Time is of the essence of this Promissory Note. A default shall occur 
under this Promissory Note if: 
2.1. Failure to Make Payments. Maker fails to make any payment under this 
Promissory Note on the date due of such payment. 
2.2. Bankruptcy. Maker, or any of the individuals referred to herein as 
Maker, becomes insolvent, a receiver is appointed to take possession of all or a substantial 
part of Maker's properties, Maker makes an assignment for the benefit of creditors or files a 
voluntary petition in bankruptcy or Maker is the subject of an involuntary petition in 
bankruptcy that is not dismissed within 60 days. 
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2.3. Notes. A payment default occurs under any other promissory note of 
Maker, in favor of either or both Central Equipment, LC, a Utah limited liability company, 
and/or McQueen Masonry, Inc., a Utah corporation, that goes uncorrected after 15 days prior 
written notice of default: 
2.4. Deed of Trust. A default in that deed of trust granted by Maker in 
favor of Holder to secure the payment of this Promissory Note; 
2.5. Security Agreement. A default in that security agreement granted by 
Maker in favor of Holder to secure payment of this Promissory Note 
3. Remedies. In the event of a default under this Promissory Note, Holder, at its 
option, may take any one or more of the following actions: 
3.1. Acceleration and Legal Action. Declare the entire unpaid principal 
balance of the debt evidenced hereby, and all interest on such debt and all other costs and 
expenses evidenced hereby, to be immediately due and payable, notwithstanding any other 
provision hereof, and commence legal action for collection and enforcement of the Promissory 
Note, including all costs and reasonable attorneys fees incurred in connection therewith. 
3.2. Other Remedies. Pursue any other right or remedy provided herein or 
otherwise allowed by law. Holder may pursue any such rights or remedies singly, together or 
successively. Exercise of any such right or remedy shall not be deemed an election of 
remedies. Failure to exercise any right or remedy shall not be deemed a waiver of any 
existing or subsequent default nor a waiver of any such right or remedy. 
4, Governing Law, Severability. 
4.1. Governing Law. This Promissory Note has been executed under and 
shall be construed and enforced in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah. 
4.2. Severability. If any provision of this Promissory Note is found by a 
court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid or unenforceable as written, then the parties 
intend and desire that (a) such provision shall be enforceable to the full extent permitted by 
law and (b) the invalidity or unenforceability of such provision shall not affect the validity and 
enforceability of the remainder of this Promissory Note. 
5. Amendment. This Promissory Note may not be amended, modified or 
changed, nor shall any provision hereof be deemed waived, except only by an instrument in 
writing signed by the party against whom enforcement of any such waiver, amendment, 
change or modification is sought. 
6. Binding Agreement. This Promissory Note shall be binding upon the 
successors and assigns of Maker. 
7. Security. The payment of this Promissory Note is secured by a deed of trust 
and a security agreement, each dated the same date as this Promissory Note. 
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This Promissory Note is intended to be effective as of the date and year first above 
written. 
PC CRANE SERVICE LIMITED 
LIABILITY COMPANY, a Utah limited 
liability company 
By:~~7P Stefa^S ^/_3s£s(' 
Name: j^&fcltttcZfff,, 
Title: p>/L&9 
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Triple 7 Crane sale 
Compound Period 
Nominal Annual Rate.... 
Effective Annual Rate... 
Periodic Rate 
Daily Rate • 
CASH FLOW DATA 
Event 
1 Loan 
2 Payment 
3 Payment 
: Monthly 
10.000 % 
10.471 % 
0.8333 % 
0.02740 % 
Start Date 
04/01/2005 
05/01/2005 
04/01/2008 
Amount 
177,600.00 
2,122.46 
152,879.31 
Number Period 
1 
35 Monthly 
1 
C7 ~ * 
End Date 
03/01/2008 
AMORTIZATION SCHEDULE - Normal Amortization 
Date Payment Interest Principal Balance 
Loan 04/01/2005 
1 05/01/2005 
2 06/01/2005 
3 07/01/2005 
. 4 08/01/2005 
5 09/01/2005 
6 10/01/2005 
7 11/01/2005 
8 12/01/2005 
2005 Totals 
9 01/01/2006 
10 02/01/2006 
11 03/01/2006 
12 04/01/2006 
13 05/01/2006 
14 06/01/2006 
15 07/01/2006 
16 08/01/2006 
17 09/01/2006 
18 10/01/2006 
19 11/01/2006 
20 12/01/2006 
2006 Totals 
21 01/01/2007 
22 02/01/2007 
23 03/01/2007 
24 04/01/2007 
25 05/01/2007 
26 06/01/2007 
27 07/01/2007 
2,122.46 
2,122.46 
2,122.46 
2,122.46 
2,122.46 
2,122.46 
2,122.46 
2,122.46 
16,979.68 
2,122.46 
2,122.46 
2,122.46 
2,122.46 
2,122.46 
2,122.46 
2,122.46 
2,122.46 
2,122.46 
2,122.46 
2,122.46 
2,122.46 
25,469.52 
2,122.46 
2,122.46 
2,122.46 
2,122.46 
2,122.46 
2,122.46 
2,122.46 
1,480.00 
1,474.65 
1,469.25 
1,463.80 
1,458.32 
1,452.78 
1,447.20 
1.441.57 
11,687.57 
1,435.90 
1,430,18 
1,424.41 
1,418.59 
1,412.73 
1.406.81 
1.400.85 
1,394.83 
1,388.77 
1,382.66 
1,376.49 
1,370.28 
16,842.50 
1,364.01 
1.357.69 
1,351.31 
1,344.89 
1.338.41 
1.331.87 
1,325.29 
642.46 
647.81 
653.21 
658.66 
664.14 
669.68 
675.26 
680.89 
5,292.11 
686.56 
692.28 
698.05 
703.87 
709.73 
715.65 
721.61 
727.63 
733.69 
739.80 
745.97 
752.18 
8,627.02 
758.45 
764.77 
771.15 
777.57 
784.05 
790.59 
797.17 
177,600.00 
176,957.54 
176,309.73 
175,656.52 
174,997.86 
174,333.72 
173,664.04 
172,988.78 
172,307.89 
171,621.33 
170,929.05 
170,231.00 
169,527.13. 
168,817.40 
168,101.75 
167.380.14 
166,652.51 
165,918.82 
165,179.02 
164,433.05 
163,680.87 
162,922.42 
162,157.65 
161,386.50 
160,608.93 
159,824.88 
159,034.29 
158,237.12 
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Triple 7 Crane sale 
Date 
28 08/01/2007 
29 09/01/2007 
30 10/01/2007 
31 11/01/2007 
32 12/01/2007 
2007 Totals 
33 01/01/2008 
34 02/01/2008 
35 03/01/2008 
36 04/01/2008 
2008 Totals 
Grand Totals 
Payment 
2,122.46 
2,122.46 
2,122.46 
2.122.46 
2,122.46 
25,469.52 
2,122.46 
2,122.46 
2,122.46 
152,879.31 
159,246.69 
227,165.41 
Interest 
1,318.64 
1,311.94 
1,305.19 
1,298.38 
1,291.51 
15,939.13 
1,284.59 
1,277.61 
1,270.56 
1,263.45 
5,096.21 
49,565.41 
Principal 
803.82 
810.52 
817.27 
824.08 
830.95 
9,530.39 
837.87 
844.85 
851.90 
151,615.86 
154,150.48 
177.600.00 
Balance 
157,433.30 
156,622.78 
155,805.51 
154,981.43 
154,150.48 
153,312.61 
152.467.76 
151,615.86 
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DEED OF TRUST. 
ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS, FIXTURE FILING 
AND SECURITY AGREEMENT 
NOTICE: THIS DEED OF TRUST ALSO CONSTITUTES 
AND IS FILED AS A FIXTURE FILING 
This DEED OF TRUST, ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS, and SECURITY 
AGREEMENT AND FIXTURE FILING is made as of March 21, 2005, by and among: LACY 
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, a Utah limited liability company, whose address is 41 No. Old 
Highway, Park City, Utah ('Trustor"); Jay B. Bell, Esq. whose address is 215 South State Street, 
12th floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, as "Trustee;" and MCQUEEN CRANE SERVICES LLC, 
whose address is 4014 Nike Drive, West Jordan, Utah 84088, as "Beneficiary." Trustor and 
Beneficiary are each sometimes referred to herein as a "Party" and collectively as the "Parties." 
1. Grant in Trust. Trustor hereby grants, transfers, assigns, conveys and warrants to 
Trustee IN TRUST, WITH THE POWER OF SALE, all rights, title and interest which Trustor now 
has or may later acquire in that certain real property (the "Property") located in Summit County, 
State of Utah, described on Exhibit A attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference, 
together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements now or hereafter located thereon. 
2. Secured Obligations. Trustor makes the grant, conveyance, transfer and assignment 
set forth in Section 1 above for the purpose of securing the following (collectively, the 
"Obligations"): 
(a) repayment of all amounts owed by Trustor under that certain Promissory 
Note dated October 18, 2004, in the original principal amount of $228,800.00, and all extensions, 
modifications, renewals or replacements of the Obligations; 
(b) repayment of all amounts owed by Trustor under that certain Promissory 
Note dated October 18, 2004, in the original principal amount of $139,450.00, and all extensions, 
modifications, renewals or replacements of the Obligations; 
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(c) repayment of all amounts owed by Trustor under that certain Promissory 
Note of even date herewith in the original principal amount of $49,000.00, and all extensions, 
modifications, renewals or replacements of the Obligations; 
(d) repayment of all amounts owed by Trustor under that certain Promissory 
Note of even date herewith in the original amount of $177,600,00, and all extensions, 
modifications, renewals or replacements of the Obligations; 
(e) the payment and performance of each agreement of Trustor contained 
herein; and 
(f) the payment of all sums expended or advanced by Beneficiary under or 
pursuant to the terms of this Deed of Trust, together with interest thereon as provided herein. 
3. Condition of Property. Trustor agrees to comply with all laws, covenants and 
restrictions affecting the Property; not to commit or permit waste thereof; not to commit, suffer or 
permit any act with respect to the Property in violation of law; to do all other acts which from the 
character or use of the Property may be reasonably necessary, the specific enumerations herein not 
excluding the general. 
4. Remedies. Should Trustor fail to make any payment or to do any act as herein 
provided, then Beneficiary or Trustee, but without obligation so to do and without notice to or 
demand upon Trustor and without releasing Trustor from any obligation hereof, may: make or do 
the same in such manner and to such extent as either may deem necessary to protect the security 
hereof; commence, appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the security 
hereof or the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; pay, purchase, contest, or compromise any 
encumbrance, charge or lien which in the judgment of either appears to be prior or superior hereto; 
and in exercising any such powers, incur any liability, expend whatever amounts in its absolute 
discretion it may deem necessary therefor, including cost of evidence of title, employ counsel, and 
pay counsel's reasonable fees. 
5. Trustee's Powers. At any time and from time to time upon written request of 
Beneficiary, payment of its fees and presentation of this Deed of Trust (in case of full reconveyance, 
for cancellation and retention), without affecting the liability of any person for the payment of the 
indebtedness secured hereby, Trustee may (a) join in any subordination or other agreement affecting 
this Deed of Trust or the lien or charge thereof; or (b) reconvey, without warranty, all or any part of 
the Property. The grantee in any reconveyance may be described as "the person or persons entitled 
thereto", and the recitals therein of any matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness 
thereof. Trustor agrees to pay reasonable Trustee's fees for any of the services mentioned in this 
paragraph. 
6. Events of Default. The occurrence of any one or more of the following events 
(including the passage of time, if any, specified therefor) shall constitute an event of default by 
Trustor under this Deed of Trust: 
BK1633PG0915 
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(a) If Trustor shall fail, refuse or neglect to pay or perform any obligation or 
agreement secured hereby, including without limitation the Obligations listed above, for a period of 
ten days after Trustor's actual receipt of a notice from Beneficiary, detailing the payment due or the 
obligation required to be performed; 
(b) If Trustor shall fail, refuse or neglect to perform and discharge fully and 
timely any obligation or agreement required in this Deed of Trust for a period of ten days after 
Trustor's actual receipt of a notice from Beneficiary, detailing the payment due or the obligation 
required to be performed; and 
(c) If Trustor shall become insolvent or shall file a voluntary petition for relief 
under the United States Bankruptcy Code or have filed against Trustor an involuntary petition for 
relief under the United States Bankruptcy Code. 
7. No Waiver. The failure on the part of Beneficiary to promptly enforce any right 
hereunder shall not operate as a waiver of such right, and the waiver by Beneficiary of any default 
shall not constitute a waiver of any other or subsequent default. 
8. Notice of Default. Time is of the essence hereof. Upon the occurrence of any event 
of default, all sums secured hereby shall immediately become due and payable at the option of 
Beneficiary. In the event of such default, Beneficiary may execute or cause Trustee to execute a 
written Notice of Default and of election to cause the Property to be sold to satisfy the obligations 
hereof, and Trustee shall file such notice for record in each county wherein the Property or some 
part or parcel thereof is situated. 
9. Trustee's Sale. After the lapse of such time as may then be required by law, Trustee, 
without demand on Trustor, shall be entitled to sell the Property on the date and at the time and 
place designated in a Notice of Sale, which Notice of Sale shall be prepared, posted, published, and 
mailed as then required by applicable Utah law, provided that any trustee's sale of the Property or 
personal property relating thereto shall be held and conducted in accordance with the laws of the 
State of Utah. 
10. Mortgage Foreclosure. Upon the occurrence of any event of default hereunder, 
. Beneficiary shall have the option to declare all sums secured hereby immediately due and payable 
and foreclose this Deed of Trust in the manner provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on 
real property, and Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceeding all costs and expenses 
incident thereto, including a reasonable attorneys' fee in such amount as shall be fixed by the court. 
11- Successor Trustee. Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing 
for record in the office of the County Recorder of each county in which the Property or some part 
thereof is situated, a substitution of trustee. From the time the substitution is filed for record, the 
new trustee shall succeed to all the powers, duties, authority and title of the Trustee named herein or 
any successor trustee. Each such substitution shall be executed and acknowledged, and notice 
thereof shall be given and proof thereof made, in the manner provided by law. 
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12. Successors and Assigns, This Deed of Trust shall apply to, inure to the benefit of, 
and bind all parties hereto, their successors and assigns. In this Deed of Trust, whenever the context 
requires, the masculine gender includes the feminine and/or neuter, and the singular number 
includes the plural. 
13. Governing Law. This Deed of Trust shall be governed by and construed in 
accordance with the laws of the State of Utah. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Deed of Trust has been executed to be effective as 
of the date and year first above written. 
TRUSTOR: 
LACY LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, a 
Utah limited liability commuiy 
Name: 
Its: Member 
And By:. 
Name: 
Its: Member 
:>g? (VJ-/^^" __ 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
On the IS % day 
) 
)$s. 
> 
of Ae&* c~ , 2005, personally appeared before me 
j>W£ fonfrtc**, VfUzM S^gr^v^' t- whose identity is personally known to me or proved 
to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence, and who, being by me duly sworn (or affirmed), did say 
that he is the Member of LACY LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, a Utah limited liability 
company, and that said document was signed by him in behalf of said entity. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
JOYCPRIGGE 
PQ BOK $61748. M83 Newpark Blvd 
Perk City. UT 84098 
My Commission Expires 
November 16, 2008 
STATE OF UTAH 
NOTiRY PUBLIC 
CJ^L-
Residing at: /¥#3 A/c*/f*f& £ / ' < && & £ <T fi 
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STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
) )ss. 
) 
On the /£T^ day of _ , 2005, personally appeared before me 
/)Avg Bffckjtr (/(#*/.&££,£#£rz _, whose identity is personally known to me or proved 
to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence, and who, being by me duly sworn (or affirmed), did say 
that he is the Member of LACY LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, a Utah limited liability 
company, and that said document was signed by him in behalf of said entity. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
JOYCPRIGGE 
PO 6o* 981748.1483 Newpatk 0(vd 
^ °arkCity,UT 84098 
A*J My Commission Expires 
y November 18, 2006 
STATE OF UTAH 
NOT^R^PmU^ ~ T~~ 
Residing at:/¥#5 /[//*/P«^ lAyjz- 6/7y „T?'*/C' " 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
LEGAL DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPERTY 
Beginning at a point north 89 degrees 52'38" West 2445.88 feet along section line and North 
2245.55 feet from the Southeast corner of Section 35, Township 1 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian; and running thence south 43 degrees 58'30" East 450.00 feet; thence South 46 
degrees 01'30" West 570.97 feet to a point on a 5629.55 foot radius curve to the right, whose radius 
point bears North 48 degrees 17'46" East 5629.55 feet; thence Northwesterly along the arc of said 
curve 259.73 feet thru a central angle of 02 degrees 38'37"; thence North 43 degrees 38'43" East 
230.50 feet; thence North 28 degrees 56'39" East 135.94 feet; thence North 11 degrees 39'22" East 
236.14 feet to the point of beginning. 
Excepting therefrom any portion lying within the State Highway 40 right of way. 
BK1G93 PGe313 
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/ ^ 
GUARANTY 
As an accommodation of the extension of credit by Central Equipment, L.C., 
a Utah limited liability company and McQueen Masonry, Inc., a Utah corporation 
(collectively '"Creditors") to PC Crane Service Limited Liability Company, a Utah limited 
liability company ("Borrower") pursuant to a promissory note in the principal amount of 
$49,000.00 and one in the amount of $177,600.00, each executed the same date as this 
Guaranty (the "Notes") the undersigned guarantors unconditionally, irrevocably and jointly 
and severally guarantee to Creditors the prompt and full payment of all sums now or 
hereinafter due pursuant to said Notes or otherwise due any of the Creditors by Borrower 
pursuant to the Notes and any other debt or obligation of Borrower, notwithstanding 
whether said debt is primary or secondary, or whether said debt is liquidated or 
unliquidated, absolute or contingent. 
The undersigned agree to remain fully bound on this Guaranty 
notwithstanding any extension, renewal, forbearance, modification, waiver, or release, 
discharge or substitution of any party, collateral or security for the Notes or other debt, and 
the undersigned consents to and waives all notice, presentment, demand, protest and notice 
of protest or non-payment of same. In the event of default, the Creditors or any of them 
may seek payment directly from the undersigned without need to precede first against 
Borrower or any other party. The undersigned waives all suretyship defenses generally, 
and agrees to remain fully bound until said Note and debt is fully paid. 
The undersigned further agrees to jointly and severally pay all reasonable 
attorney fees and costs necessary for the enforcement of this Guaranty. 
AT'I if 
DATED: Masefe ,2005. 
Lacy Limited Liability Company, a Utah 
limited liability COE 
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OPTION TO PURCHASE 
AGREEMENT made May , 2005, by and between PC Crane LLC, a Utah Limited 
Liability Company (d.b.a. McQueen Crane Service) located at ("PC Crane"), and 
Lon Stam, ("Stam") an individual residing at . 
In consideration of one dollar ($l)and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt of 
which is hereby acknowledged, it is agreed as follows: 
1. OPTION. PC Crane hereby grants to Stam the option to purchase up to a ten percent 
(10%) equity ownership interest in PC Crane, which option shall vest pursuant to the following 
vesting schedule so long as Stam continues to actively provide crane brokering services to PC 
Crane (the "Option"). 
Vesting Schedule 
Ownership Interest Vesting Date 
Five Percent (5%) ,2010 
Ten Percent (10%) ,2015 
2. PURCHASE PRICE. The purchase price payable for the Option shall be one dollar 
($1), to be paid by Stam to PC Crane upon exercise of this Option. 
3. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATION. In addition to the good and valuable 
consideration herein provided, Stam agrees that the referral fee paid by PC Crane to Stam for crane 
brokering services shall hence forth be _____ percent of the total monetary compensation paid to 
PC Crane for each job brokered by Stam. 
4. EXERCISE OF OPTION. This Option shall only be exercisable by Stam at the 
moment prior to sale, dissolution, or ending of PC Crane, and shall not entitle Stam to challenge, 
impede, or otherwise delay any sale or disposition of said ownership interest. Stam shall also be 
responsible for a share of the expenses, equal to the proportion of his ownership interest, arising 
out of the sale or disposition of said property, including payment of liens or other loans. 
5. NOTICE. PC Crane shall notify Stam, in writing, at least (10) days prior to 
any sale, dissolution, or ending. Failure to provide Stam with the required notice shall act to void 
and nullify any sale or voluntary dissolution or ending of the company. All notices provided for in 
this option to purchase shall be sent by certified mail with return receipt requested. 
6. NATURE OF OPTION. This Option granted herein is of an equity interest only and 
does not entitle Stam to an interest in the current profits or losses of the company or in the ongoing 
management of the company. 
7. TERMS AND CONDITIONS. 
(a) ASSIGNMENT. This Option is personal to the Purchaser and may not 
PC 000697 
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be assigned by him without the express written consent of Seller. Such consent may be 
unreasonably withheld for any reason. Any unauthorized assignment shall be void, and shall 
terminate the purchaser's rights in the option. In the event of Stam's death prior to the exercise of 
this Option, this Option shall expire and henceforth be void. 
(b) GOVERNING LAW. This Option to purchase shall be interpreted under the laws of 
the State of Utah, and any action to enforce any of the terms of this option to purchase shall be 
brought in Salt Lake County in the State of Utah. 
(c) BINDING EFFECT. This Option to purchase shall be binding upon the parties, their 
heirs, legal representatives, successors, and assigns. 
(d) ENTIRE AGREEMENT. This Option to purchase supersedes all prior agreements 
between the parties relating to its subject matter. There are not other understandings or agreements 
between them concerning the subject matter. 
In witness whereof the parties have signed this option to purchase on the 
May, 2005. 
PC Crane LLC 
By: 
Paul Belcher (Manager/Owner) 
By: 
David Belcher (Owner) 
By: 
Vernon Belcher (Owner) 
Lon Stam 
X 
(Individually) 
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A B R I E F HISTORY O F M C Q U E E N C R A N E SERVICE 
Established in 1999 McQueen Crane Services is a spin-off business of McQueen 
Masonry. Mr. McQueen acquired his first lattice crane in the late 1970's to be used in his 
masonry company. As his masonry contracting services grew to include such projects as; 
the Huntsman Cancer institute and Logan Temple renovation so did his crane service. 
Mr. McQueen takes full management charge for his masonry company, the crane 
service and other business endeavors a reality that has left him with very little time. 
Time restraints and the established growing market position of the cranes were the factors 
that led him to decide it was time to sell the business. He also acknowledged that his 
time restraints left him with the inability to realize the crane companies full potential. 
After finishing a second Masters degree with an entrepreneurial and business 
finance focus, long time friend of Mr. McQueen and his family, Paul Belcher expressed 
an interest in acquiring the crane service. In order to guarantee success for the growing 
concern that is McQueen Crane, Paul Belcher felt it wise to undertake the business 
venture with his father, Dave Belcher and his uncle, Vem Belcher. 
Paul's father and uncle are equal partners in the ownership of Park City Towing. 
They have owned Park City Towing for the last 10 years successfully growing annual 
revenues from a few thousand dollars to over a million. The company is an independent 
AAA contractor and services all insurance contracts in the Park City area including (All 
State, State Farm, Cross Country, Geico, and Progressive). Currently 70% of the income 
is contract generated. Resumes for all three top management members are included in 
(Exhibit 1). 
One of the primary advantages of going into the crane industry with Dave and 
Vern is the fact that many of the skills required to operate within the crane service 
industry are readily transferable from the towing industry. Park City Towing owns heavy 
duty tow trucks, which are basically 20 ton cranes. Furthermore, Park City Towing 
continues to provide Dave and Vem with their current living wages. The investment into 
a crane company was appealing to Dave and Vern because of complimenting cyclical 
cash flows. The crane industry has higher cash flow in the summer and the towing 
company has higher cash flows in the winter. 
One of our key goals when we purchased McQueen Crane was to increase crane 
usage through a more proactive sales approach. At the time of purchase in 2004 
McQueen Crane Service had never employed a full time marketing person and averaged 
a 43% (this means the cranes worked an average of 5 months a year) crane usage rate 
over the three years periods of 2002, 2003, and 2004. Our goal, that we projected with 
Jordan Credit Union, was to increase the usage to a rate of 65% (working the cranes an 
average of 754 months a year). After completing the full year of 2005 we exceeded our 
goal finishing the year with a 72% usage rate. Our ability to increase the companies crane 
usage by 28% resulted in a 45% increase in revenue from 2004 to 2005. Please refer to 
(Exhibit 2). 
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In our efforts to build a strong marketing position we searched out one of the most 
well connected crane brokers in the entire region. Lon Stam the owner of Associated 
Crane has more than 30 years of brokering crane service in Utah. Lon Stam has provided 
a high level of credibility to our crane company. Lease refer to (Exhibit 3) for a full list 
of our diversified clientele. 
One of the operational decisions that we and Lon collaborated on was in the 
building of a custom designed trailer that gives us the ability to use our 300 ton hydraulic 
Liebherr crane as either a 300 ton crane or a 165 ton crane. This is the primary reason for 
the drastic increase in the annual revenue production of this machine. The 300 ton crane 
alone reached a usage rate of 73% compared to a 21% usage rate in 2004 resulting in a 
71% increase in this cranes annual revenue generation. 
T H E 225Q AND M25Q M A N I T O W O C C R A W L E R S 
The crawler cranes are the next business endeavor that we are collaborating with 
Lon to undertake. The opportunity to purchase the crawlers come via Lon through a long 
time business associate Gordon Olsen. One of the key reasons for our interest in moving 
forward with the purchase of these specific cranes is because of the fact that we are in 
essence buying our competition resulting in a better market share for McQueen Crane 
Service. If we were to buy two different cranes and bring them into the state we would be 
in competition with Gordon Olsen. However, by buying his cranes we are basically buying 
his business. Please refer to letter of intent for terms of the sell and bare rental (Exhibit 4). 
We would like to provide a brief history of the 2250 and M250 cranes. In the late 
nineties Salt Lake City was awarded the Olympic bid and shortly there after the 1-15 
freeway project was approved. The goal of the state was to keep the construction 
contracts in the hands of local contractors. However, at the time there were no cranes in 
the state large enough to undertake a project of this scale. 
Gordon Olsen's primary business is the fabrication and erection of bridges. His 
company was the only one large enough in the state to fulfill the 1-15 steel bridge 
contract. Once Gordon was awarded the steel contract he collaborated with Lon on 
determining the cranes that would be required to complete the project. It was determined 
that Manitowoc's M250 and 2250 series cranes with Max-er attachments would ideally 
fit the job. Please refer to (Exhibit 5) for full specs and appraisals of the cranes. 
Gordon arrange a lease buy option with the Manitowoc factor for three new 
cranes. Gordon never intended to enter into the crane rental business he only intended to 
use the cranes to complete the M5 project. However, once the 1-15 project was 
completed Gordon was contacted by several business interested in putting the cranes on 
other projects. Gordon always intended to sell the cranes once LI5 was complete. He 
has been unable to sell them due to the fact that they have moved from project to project 
almost non-stop over that last 3 years. 
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Gordon's company was recently awarded the contract to erect a new bridge that 
will span the Hoover dam canyon. It will be the tallest bridge ever erected in the entire 
country. Due to this recent contract and Gordon's advance age he has determined that it 
is time to sell the cranes. He contacted Lon to see if he would have any interest in 
purchasing the cranes. Lon quickly brought the investment opportunity to us. And once 
again as soon as we agreed to purchase the cranes they are already out working. As of 
for now the cranes will both be on guaranteed projects that will continue through the next 
eight months. Furthermore, we have not even purchased the cranes yet and have already 
had several inquires from businesses interested in their availability. 
FINANCING 
In March of 2004 we were interested in purchasing another crane from Mr. 
McQueen. We wanted to purchase his 1999 Manitowoc 777T. However, due to the fact 
that we had closed the Jordan Credit Union loan only months earlier we were unable to 
acquire financing. Dave Belcher was visiting with his neighbor and friend Mitch Jensen 
of Siegfried & Jensen and he mentioned the difficulties in obtaining financing. Mitch 
expressed an interest in exploring the possibilities of collaborating on the financing. 
Siegfried & Jensen were interested in possible tax depreciation advantages. 
Valerie Swaner of Zions Bank Equipment Leasing was consulted for 
recommendations of structuring a lease that would facilitate both the purchase of the 
crane and the depreciation benefits. Valerie is one of Zions Bank Leasing specialists and 
has worked on many different types of lease structures and was able to create a funding 
strategy that benefited both parties. The purchase of the crane was finalized in March of 
2004. (Jim Miller has been provided with all the lease structure paper work and is using 
it as a model for the funding of the 2250 and the M250 cranes.) 
All parties involved; Dave Belcher, Vern Belcher, Paul Belcher, PC Crane 
Service DBA: McQueen Crane, Park City Towing, Mitch Jensen, Ned Siegfried, S&J 
Leasing and Siegfried & Jensen all understand their full responsibilities as guarantors on 
the loan to purchase the 2250 & M250. 
McQueen Crane's funding strategies and funding collaborations are considered 
proprietary information. We consider the information of whom we finically collaborate 
with as PRIVATE. We expect that this information will only be used in the strictest of 
confidence. 
Prepared by: 
McQueen Crane Service 
For any additional questions please contact us 
801-688-3250 
Or mcqueencrane@yahoo.com 
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EXHIBIT 4 
jr*\ Letter of sale terms and bare rental agreement 
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ID 
D 
O 
CONTRACTORS • ENGINEERS • CRANE RENTAL 
December 15,2005 
P.C Crane 
4115 Atkinson Avenue 
P. O. Box 980921 
Park city, Utah 84098 
ATT: Mr. Vem Belcher 
REF: Crane Purchase 
Dear Van, 
OLSENBBAL agrees that it will sell to P.C. Crane on a cash sale basis on 01-03-06 the 
following listed equipment in accordance with the terms and conditions listed herein: 
1 - Manitowae M2250 Crawler Crane 
Serial No. M-225-1020 
With Maxer 225 Heavy Lift Attachment 
Full 200 ft. Luffing Jib Attachment 
Price: 52,500,000.00 
1 Manitowae M250 Crawler Crane 
Serial No. M250-1109 
With Maxer 225 Heavy Lift Attachment 
Full 200 Ft. Luffing Jib Attachment 
Price: $2,400,000. 
TERMS: 
$3,950,000.00 - Cash at closing on January 3,2006. The title will remain with 
OLSENBBAL until closing. OLSENBEAL agrees to cany a non-interest bearing note 
for $950,000.00 with no payments due for 1 year. 
To facilitate this transaction, OLSENBEAL will pay P.C. Crane a rental rate of 
$32,000.00 per month for at least one (1) crane that will be operated and maintained and 
insured by OLSENBEAL for a period of six (6) months. In fee event, that the second 
crane is out on a rental, these same arrangements would be applicable for however long 
that rental period would be. that rental period ould be. 
Gordon L. Olsen - President Vettt Belcher - Vjfee President 
Olsen-Beal Associates P.C. Crane 
1490 Wost 200 South • Ltrvdon, UT 640*2 • 601/765-6886 • FAX 601/785-0088 
w&bsite - www.olsenboaLporri • email ^ Info(g>oisenb&e1,com 
UT Uc. #411297 • GA'Uc. *685>456 • NV Uc. O33460 
ID Lfo. *536r-AAA-123 • AZ Lie.. #$26650 • OR Uc. V148059 
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lNovcmbcrll>2005 
Via Facsimile & Mail 
OLSENBEAL ' ?"? ^ ^ " ^ 
1490 West 200 South ^ 
Liridon, Utah 84042 J / V / ^ 
nrf 
Attention: Mr. Steve L. Olsen 
Reference: Planet Hollywood 
SWS Project No. 91156 
Subject: Crane Rental -Purchase Order 
Dear Steve: 
71ns letter serves as your Purchase Order No. 91156-8001 to fiimish rental for (1) Manitowoc 
2250 Crane with 180% main boom, 160* luffing jib and 100' fixed jib in accordance with 
following: 
Purchase Order Price Base on the .Following: 
See attached Olscnbeal revised Proposal dated 10/5/05 Lo MJ, Dean. 
Mobilize & Assemble $45,000.00 
Crane work day 79 days @ $2,5)20.00/ day = $230,6*80-00 
Standby 41 days ©$1,650.00/ day « $67,650.00 
Disassemble & Move Out $45.000.00 
Projected Totals $388,330,00 
Schedule of Work • 
See MJ. Dean Crane Schedule dated 9/23/05 attached. 
Scoioe of Work ' * 
Furnish all equipment, labor and material required for the rental of (1) Manitowoc 2250 
Crane for the above referenced project. 
> 
Based OJIMJ. Dean 
Crane Schedule 
v BAF0173 
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NO 505 P. 4 
U
* " K 003/003 
OLSEHBeAL 
November 11, 2005 
Page2of2 
Terms of Payment 
Invoice to be submitted by the 15th of each monlh, SME Steel Contractors will issue 
payments. 
The following information and attachments arc to be included with each invoice: 
SWS Job No. 91156 
Phase Code No. 8001 
Billing Period 
Attachments included with each invoice: 
Time tickets for labor Sc equipment sign daily by M. J. Dean. 
Southwest Steel is confident that Oisenbeal will do thcirutmost to maintain Southwest SteePs 
reputation for quality and ability to maintain schedule requirements. Please acknowledge 
accept-dnce of the above by signing below and returning (fax is acceptable) to our office. 
Should you have any questions or comments please do not hesitate to contact me. 
Accepted ' 
By: OLSEt$&EAL 
Name: 
Sincerely, 
SOUTHWEST STEEL 
( ^ 
Teny H.Walker 
Senior Project Manager 
cc: 9U56.obc 
Title: &dM*y S*t**«j-
o^Jhlt^L 
* 
BAF 0174 
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